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PREFACE
This study was undertaken primarily to provide some basic
research in the field of Montana economic history.
Company was chosen for a number of reasons.

The Hope Mining

First, a good deal of

information was available in the business records of the company at
the Montana State Historical Society Library at Helena, Montana, and
in the Letterbooks of James and Granville Stuart at the Montana State
University Library at Missoula, Montana.

Second, silver mining as an

industry in Montana has been long neglected by writers who concentrated
on the more romantic gold and copper mining industries.

And third, the

Hope Mining Company provided a good subject for a case history because
of its long period of active operation in Montana.
The paper is not intended as a history of silver mining in
Montana, nor even a sophisticated analysis of the Hope Company.

If the

author has made the raw data stored in Helena available to other schol
ars in some sort of order, he will be most satisfied.

It is hoped that

these data will become more valuable after the business records of the
Granite Mountain and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies, stored at the Mon
tana State Historical Society Library, are sorted and compiled in a
similar manner.

The nature of the data and the aim of this paper sug

gested the chronological organization and quantity of statistical data
which are included in the text.

It is believed that in the present

form, the paper will best achieve the aim of providing groundwork for
a larger study of silver mining in Montana.
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Obtaining data concerning silver mining for an economic history
presents unique problems.

Although a number of monographs have been

written on silver mining, a good economic history on the subject does
not exist.

T. A. Rickard’s A History of American Mining remains the

best single study of mining in the west even though the book is now
old and written from an engineer's viewpoint.

Robert S. Lewis'

Elements of Mining and Theodore J. Hoover's Economics of Mining are
useful, but again written by engineers.

While limited in scope, Clark

Spence's British Investments and the American Mining Frontier provides
an excellent account of promotional techniques used in early mining
ventures.

A good deal of information can also be gleaned from the

older histories of Montana, but these books contain little information
on economic history,

R. W. Raymond has written several valuable books,

and Alex Del Mar's A History of the Precious Metals from the Earliest
Times to the Present and Grant H. Smith's The History of the Comstock
Lode, I85 O-I92 O would have been useful had they been available.
Periodical articles concerning the economic history of silver
mining are almost nonexistent.

A good deal has been written on the

silver controversy and gold mining, but most articles on silver mining
emphasize engineering.

Several Government reports do contain valuable

information, especially W. H. Emmons and F. C. Calkins' Geology and Ore
Deposits of the Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana for this particular
study.
The most valuable sources of information used in this study are
the original papers of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company, the
Hope Mining Company, the Granite Mountain Mining Company, S. T. Hauser,

IV

and the Stuart brothers.

Without these original records, the study

would not have been possible.

Newspaper accounts provide valuable sup

plemental information, but financial information contained in newspapers
must be handled with extreme care.
Appreciation is due the staff of the Montana State Historical
Society Library at Helena for their cooperation and aid, particularly
John W. Hakola.

And John W. Smurr has given generously of his time and

patience in guiding me.
D *L*S.
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CHAPTER I
ST. LOUIS AND MONTANA MINING COMPANY, 186^-71
Silver mining in the West presented problems quite different
from placer mining.

A placer mine consisted simply of a shallow hole

dug into sand or gravel, with the equipment needed to work such a mine
consisting of a shovel, pick, pan and strong back.

Expenditures might

later be made to construct sluice boxes, tunnel into the deposit, build
water supply ditches, or employ hydraulic mining methods, but the proc
ess remained essentially one of removing loose particles of metal from
alluvial deposits.
Silver mining usually involved removing the metal from veins or
lodes of quartz.

The quartz had to be mined, crushed in some sort of

mill, processed to recover silver bullion, and the bullion finally
smelted for purification.

Because the processes required in silver

mining were more complex than placer mining, larger capital outlays
were required.
Realizing they could not work silver veins without capital, yet
recognizing their value, many miners claimed silver veins or lodes for
speculative purposes.

The problem for these persons became one of

finding a buyer or investor for their claims.

Because substantial in

vestment capital did not exist in Montana, the owners of such claims
had to look elsewhere.

The St. Louis and Montana Mining Company drew

its capital investment funds from St. Louis.

The link between Montana

claim owners and St. Louis investors was supplied by Samuel T. Hauser,
—1—

-2Hauser was born in Kentucky in 1833, and after becoming a civil
engineer, he spent eight years working for railroads in Missouri and
then went to Montana in 1862 with W. B. Dance,

In Montana they met

Granville and James Stuart and Rezin Anderson.

These men became the

Montana stockholders in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
Hauser was a cousin of Luther M. Kennett, and he later married the
daughter of D. A. January, both of St. Louis.

Through these two men,

access to investment capital was obtained.^
In 1865 Hauser returned to St. Louis with a power of attorney
to represent a number of Montana claim owners.

These persons owned

claims which averaged two hundred feet on quartz veins or lodes.

Each

claim was too small to be mined itself, but combined they might sell
for a good price,^
Hauser carried with him a report showing an average assay of
almost three hundred dollars in silver per ton of ore on six of the
claims.

Pending confirmation of the assay report, a tentative agree

ment for sale of the claims was reached between Hauser and the Missouri
Petroleum and Mining Company.

The assay results were confirmed and the

company agreed to pay $50,000 for the claims.

Based on the value of

A Newspaper Reference Work (Butte, Montana: Butte Newspaper
Association, 1900), no pagination. For short biographical sketches
of these man, see Appendix C, p. 8U •
^Miscellaneous Deeds of S, T, Hauser, May 18, 1865,‘in S; T,
Hauser Papers (Montana State Historical Society Library, Helena,
Montana). Cited hereafter as Hauser Papers, For a biography of
this important Montana capitalist, see the forthcoming study by John
W. Hakola.

-3this property, a subsidiary company was formed with $U0 0 ,0 0 0 capital
stock— a sizeable amount of this stock was thus "water"— and the follow3
ing month a prospectus was issued.^
This new company was styled the Missouri and Montana Mining
Company, incorporated under the laws of Missouri with John How as pres
ident, Samuel T. Hauser as vice president, and a board of directors
consisting of D. A. January, Enno Sander, Alexander Stewart and Samuel
Gaty.

The company issued U,000 shares of stock worth $100 each and

reserved $150,000 for working capital.

The property owned included

1,000 feet of silver claims in six lodes in the Rattlesnake (Argenta)
area, UOO feet near Virginia City, UOO feet in the Deer Lodge district,
and 200 feet near Bannack City— all in the southwestern portion of
Montana Territory.
According to the prospectus, the future was extremely bright.
The Rattlesnake lodes assayed over $2,000 per ton, while expenses would
run no more than $23 to $U5 per ton, as in the Washoe and Reese River
silver mining districts of Nevada.

The prospectus showed that if all

lodes were worked, annual profits would be 39 million dollars— a good
deal more than the company subsequently earned in more than forty years
of operation.

Montana was a beautiful place, the prospectus continued,

well adapted to agriculture, and easily accessible at any time during
the year.

The ore veins were three to six times wider than those of

the Washoe and Reese River districts, mine shafts could be driven to

^Letters of A. K. Eaton to Hauser, April 25; C. C. Backus to
Hauser, May 31; P- A. Ladue to Hauser, May 13; Memo of Agreement,
May 28, 1865, Hauser Papers,

-U500 feet before the water level was reached-— how this was determined

is difficult to understand— and the veins became richer as they des
cended.

A large number of people were flowing into Montana, soon to be

swelled by thousands of soldiers who had "made known their intention to
proceed at once to the Montana mines" where they could "enjoy all of the
accustomed pleasures and excitements of camp life."

The company had

scattered claims which, owing to the large investments being made in
Montana, could be worked or sold at a profit.^

How could the enter

prise fail?
It is difficult to say whether one should attribute ignorance,
deception, gross misrepresentation, or to be somewhat kinder, unbridled
optimism to the author of this prospectus.

Certainly the businessmen

of St. Louis, a city long engaged in trade with the west, were more
cognizant of actual conditions than this pamphlet indicates.

Yet, in

an age when the giant corporation was an infant and regulation of
business methods a violation of personal freedom, perhaps
attributions is correct.

none of the

If forced to choose among the possible explan

ations, I would favor optimism.

Certainly most persons associated with

mining during that period were afflicted to a greater or lesser degree
with the malady known as "mining fever."

And, certainly, this optimism

seemed justified when miners were scurrying from strike to strike,
often forgetting how short-lived some strikes were, but never forgetting
that the strikes were made.

The prospectus, while flamboyant in

^Prospectus of the Missouri and Montana Mining Company (St.
Louis ; R. F. Studley & CoTj 1865).

“

5
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language and optimistic in tone, was probably as honest as many of
the period, more honest than some.
The history of this company is unknown.

In July, however, a

second prospectus was issued under the name of the St. Louis and
Montana Mining and Discovery Company.

This pamphlet contained essen

tially the same information as the Missouri and Montana Mining Company
prospectus.

Except for the opening paragraphs describing real prop

erty, the second pamphlet quoted directly from the first.
These two companies may never have actually conducted any mining
operations.

They were both subsidiary to the Missouri Petroleum and

Mining Company.

These prospectuses reflected the shifting nature of

ownership during the summer of 1865 as attempts were made to lure in
vestors into the venture, and it is doubtful if either company
continued to exist after the formation of the St. Louis and Montana
Mining Company in the autumn of 1865.
Hauser negotiated with L. M. Kennett for the latter to act as
president of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company and attorney-infact for Hauser in all matters pertaining to the Missouri Petroleum
and Mining Company,^

Although not yet formally organized in the fall

of 1865, the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company sent Augustus Steitz
to Montana City (Argenta) to construct a smelter.^
The following January the company was formally organized as a
subsidiary of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company with capital

^Prospectus of the St, Louis and Montana Mining Company
(St. Louisi 1865)•
^For a short biographical sketch of Steitz see Appendix C .,
p. 8U .

stock of $6 0 0 ,0 0 0 . The holdings of the company included h,800 feet of
claims in the Eaton, Savage, Metropolitan, Seeker, Kearsage, Butter
field, Wadam, St. Louis, Gibraltar, Red Cedar, Golden Gate, Nonpareil,
Henry Clay, Rothchild, Prolific, Barrow, Great Eastern and Prickly Pear
lodes— none of these located at Philipsburg.

The board of directors

included an impressive array of St. Louis and Montana owners.

To

oversee operations, an executive committee for Montana was formed conO
sisting of Hauser, Walter B. Dance, James Stuart and Rezin Anderson.
When the Missouri River opened in I8 6 6 , machinery was shipped
to Montana by river steamer.

The smelter begun at Montana City

(Argenta) by Steitz in 1865 was partially completed with the help of
Philip Deidesheimer, and in August I866 Steitz began preparations for
9

production.^
The plant at Montana City was not fully completed, however, and
Steitz needed more money.

In late August, Hauser proposed that the

Montana owners advance eight or ten thousand dollars to insure comple
tion before winter began as it was too late to request funds from St.
Louis and get a r e p l y . J a m e s Stuart went to Montana City to inspect
the plant and concluded that Steitz was overly optimistic and suffer
ing from a "severe attack of quartz on the brain,"

In spite of this.

7

For a list of the directors and shareholders of this and
other closely related companies see Appendix C, p. 8U.
^The Helena Herald (Helena, Montana), May 2U, 186?, p. 1.
^A Steitz to Hauser, August I6 , I8 6 6 , Hauser Papers,
biographical sketch of Deidesheimer see Appendix C, p. 8U.

For a

^^Hauser to W. B . Dance and James Stuart, August 26, I8 6 6 ,
Hauser Papers.

he considered Hauser's judgment sound and agreed to advance any sum
necessary to complete the plant.
Two months later Steitz reported that the hot blast was begin
ning to disgorge freely, double shifts had been instituted, and the
two main furnaces c o m p l e t e d , The Montana Post said Steitz had about
sixty men employed at the works which consisted of blast, cupelling
and roasting furnaces, Scotch hearths and machinery constructed on
the Freiberg plan used in Germany.

After operations began, Steitz

recovered forty pounds of silver from one ton of ore— a promising
return. 13
The smelter continued to operate throughout the winter.

Because

of illness, Steitz was replaced by Deidesheimer, who advised Hauser
in early I867 that he would continue to operate the works at Montana
City until Steitz recovered and then proceed to erect the mill planned
at Philipsburg (Flint Creek). ^
Hauser returned to St. Louis early in 186? to raise more capital
for the mill planned at Philipsburg,

The St. Louis investors agreed

to allocate $100,000 for development in Montana, while W, B. Dance and
James Stuart sought to expand the company holdings at Philipsburg.^^

^^James Stuart to Hauser, Sept. lU, 1866, ibid.
^^Steitz to Hauser, October 1, I8 6 6 , ibid,
^^The Montana Post (Virginia City, Montana), October 6 , p. 1,
^Philip Deidesheimer to Hauser, undated (early I867 ?), Hauser
Papers.
ation.

^^The Helena Herald: Supplement, February 21, 1867, no pagin
Dance to Stuart, March 20, 1867, Hauser Papers.

■»
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Meanwhile the smelter at Montana City was started by Deide
sheimer and, although the lining of the furnace caused trouble, the
operation was successful for a short time.

After the furnace lining

was repaired, a considerable amount of ore was smelted, but the
Montana City works were not profitable.

Perhaps the major reason for

failure was the scanty knowledge of smelting processes.

In addition,

there was no market for the lead produced as a by-product, coking
coal was not locally available (the company used charcoal as a substitute), and transportation was costly. 17
1R
closed in the summer of 186?~

The Montana City works were

Of the various reasons for failure, transportation costs are of
special interest.

With all her natural riches, Montana was, and to

some extent remains, geographically isolated from sources of supplies
and markets.

Modern means of transport have alleviated the problem

but have not remedied it completely.

In the l860’s supplies and ore

could be hauled by wagon to Ft, Benton and shipped via the Missouri
during the summer months, hauled by wagon some 500 miles south to
Corrine, Utah, and shipped via the Union Pacific Railroad after 1869,
or hauled west by wagon over the Mullan road to Walla Walla, Washing
ton and transshipped via the Columbia River,

Any route was costly;

all required haulage of several hundred miles by wagon through

^^The Rocky Mountain Gazette (Helena, Montana), March 30, 1867,
p. 1.
^^R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines (New York:
Co., 1 8 6 9 ), pp. 1 5 0 -5 1 .

J. B. Ford &

S. Keys to Hauser, August 5, I8 6 7 , Hauser Papers.

-9mountainous country.

The hardships that could be caused by weather,

especially in winter, are apparent to anyone familiar with Montana
where weather conditions are seldom moderate.

A further complicating

factor was the uncertainty of how far supplies had to be freighted by
wagon if they moved to or from the Missouri,

During the winter the

river was blocked by ice, and in the summer low water often prevented
steamboats from proceeding beyond Ft. Union near the present day
Montana-North Dakota state boundary.

If the problem of transport had

been solved, the lack of a lead market and coking coal would not have
been so crucial.
By mid-1 8 6 7 , construction of the James Stuart mill at Philips
burg had begun with G, C. Swallow assisting in construction,^^

Samuel

Gaty replaced L„ M, Kennett as president, and in July 100 men were at
Of)

work on the mill under the supervision of James Stuarti

While the

work progressed during the summer of 186?, the investors in St. Louis
complained about the non-receipt of ore shipments and information con
cerning local operations.

John How told Hauser that the directors

were tired of promises and lack of information.

The company would not

advance any more funds until progress reports were received.
saying:

"I write you wishing I had never heard of Montana."

19

He ended
p “l

The Rocky Mountain Gazette, June 22, 186?, p. 3.

20

L, M. Kennett to Hauser, June 6, 186?, Hauser Papers. The
Rocky Mountain Gazette, July 6, 186?, p, 1. The Montana Post, August
10, 1867, p. 1.
21

Samuel Gaty and John How to Hauser, June 11 and August 12,

1 8 6 7 , Hauser Papers,

—10“
The James Stuart mill was completed October 3> 1B6? at a cost
of about $75,000.

After a short run to adjust machinery, full opera

tions began October lU.

The mill had a custom-built U5 horsepower

steam engine, ten ore stamps, six amalgamating pans, and three concen
trators.

The opening was a gala event for Philipsburg and was

accompanied by a celebration which included speeches, toasts, a band
and dancing,
Operations began as a complete success, and James Stuart
notified treasurer How that 259 pounds of bullion were recovered from
35 tons of ore at a cost of $25 per ton for processing.

One month

later the milling of 250 tons of ore had _yxexded 790 pounds of bullion.
Encouraged by these results, James Stuart put two shifts of miners on
the Hope lode to dig a six-foot square hole designed to reveal the
extent of the ore body.^^
Work on the Hope lode continued during the following winter.
Philipsburg now had a population of 600, and the Herald called the
mill at the end of Main Street "an ornament in its architectural
finish" and "a model of workmanship."^^

^n September, 1867,

1,6UU

shares of special preferred stock were issued with prospects apparently
good enough for Hauser to invest an additional $16,100 (U60 shares)
for himself "and associates.

Exhaustion of the ore body caused the

22

The Montana Post, October 26, 1867, p. 5. See also Appendix
B, p . 79 •
23
W. H. Keys to James Stuart and Hauser, October 15 and Novem
ber 21, 1 8 6 7 , Hauser Papers.
^^The Helena Herald (Helena, Montana), January 2, I8 6 8 , p, 7 .
^Receipt of How to Hauser, February 11, 1%6S, Hauser Papers.

—11“
mill to stop early in 1868, but the company had succeeded in
recovering 58.5 per cent of the silver content in the ore compared
with only UO per cent when operation first began.
With the mill closed, exploration and development work con
tinued on the Hope lode during the summer of 1868.

The ore recovered

was not sufficient to keep the mill in steady operation, however, and
by August the mill was doing custom work on ores from the Rumley and
Burgher lodes.

Two months later the mill was operating on second

class ore from the Poor Man's Joy with better quality ore shipped to
New York or Europe for processing.
Custom milling did not pay expenses, however, and James Stuart
was disappointed in silver mining.

By October, 1868, he was ready to

get out of the company because, as he wrote Hauser, quartz mining was
"humbug" and would pay only once in a thousand times.

He estimated

that $100,000 were required to pay debts, prospect, and wait for a
paying lode to be discovered.

The company owed more than $^0,000 by

this time and prospects for improvement were dim.

Dance agreed. 27

The company was indeed in financial difficulty, and in October,
1868 supplies at Montana City were attached for debts.

In addition,

the company owed $2,000 in taxes to three co\anties— Beaverhead, Madi
son, and Deer Lodge,

The company agent at Montana City had been trying

to sell the equipment for a year with no success,

Stuart said that

only a mortgage held by Dance, Stuart and Company prevented a number

2^The Helena Herald, March 26, 1868, p. 1.
27james Stuart to Hauser, October l6, 1^68, Hauser Papers,

=

of law suits.
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Apparently the mortgage of Dance, Stuart and Company

covered most of the property at Argenta, thus giving them first right
pQ
to collection of debts.
One month later the mill at Philipsburg was closed with all
except five miners discharged.

Because custom milling of Rumley and

Burgher ores on a percentage basis was not profitable, James Stuart
offered to mill the ore for $2^ per ton in currency.
refused.

The offer was

Although there was enough ore available to pay expenses,

litigation concerning the ownership of claims persuaded James Stuart
to close the mill. 29
Silver production in Montana during 1868 yielded about
$100,000, while $1^,000,000 were received from the sale of other
minerals, principally gold.

R. W. Raymond, United States commissioner

of mining statistics, thought Montana needed a separation of mine and
furnace ownership, a market for lead, cheaper labor, and coal suscep- tible of being coked.
presented a problem.

The mineral law passed by Congress in 1866 also
0. B. O'Bannan, United States land office regis

trar in Helena, said that of thirty-six applications for patents in
Montana under the law, seven were contested, six withdrawn, andnine patents
actually issued.

Because proceedings for obtaining a patent were so

tedious and expensive, most claim owners thought it better to depend

?RJames Stuart to Hauser, October 31, 1868, Stuart Letterbook
A, (Montana State University Library, Missoula, Montana). Hereafter
cited as Stuart Letterbook A or B.
29James Stuart to Hauser, November 12, 1868, ibid.

—
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on claim rights alone rather than apply for a patent and risk a
lawsuit.
The law in most mining districts during this period was a
c\irious, complicated amalgamation of British, French, and Spanish
mining laws and customs.

With the discovery of gold in California

in I8U9 , Americans faced the problom of national mining laws for the
first time.

Several statutes relating to mining had been passed by

the federal government, but most pertained only to specific cases or
minerals.

Because no uniform body of statutes or common law for

mining existed, the California miners organized districts, drew on
their imperfect knowledge and impressions of what mineral law should
be, and decided upon the laws of the district.

In spite of a rather

feeble attempt in 1866 to standardize mining law, a determination of
the law applying to any particular mining district prior to 18?2 de
pended upon crude--yet somehow workable— laws written by the miners.
The federal act of 1872 did set forth a national mining law, and this
act remains the major mineral statute to this day.
In the annual report for I868 the St. Louis and Montana Mining
Company said that 1^,560 shares of common stock at par value of $100
each had been issued in addition to 1,6UU shares of preferred stock
issued in September 186? at $35 per share.
in December, I868 at $80 per share.

The latter were redeemable

In view of the generous apprecia

tion of value promised on the preferred stock, it is assumed that this

R. W. Raymond, The Mines of the West (New York; J, B, Ford
& Co., 1 8 6 9 ), pp. 150-55. For definitions of mining terms, see
Appendix D, p. 88.

-iLissue was intended only for sale to common stockholders, although no
indication of intent is discernible from the data.

The company had

raised a total of $287,000 from stock sales— $6 0 ,0 0 0 of which came
from tiie sale of preferred stock— in addition to $65,000 received from
the sale of bullion.

Of total funds raised, $130,000 were lost on

operations at Montana City and the property there was worth only
$5,000.

Company holdings at Philipsburg were valued at some $lli7,000,

but debts against these holdings amounted to $73,000.
The board of directors decided to sell $100,000 in bonds bearing
ten per cent interest and payable in eighteen m o n t h s . T h e bonds,
which were later purchased chiefly by stockholders, were sold at eighty
cents on the dollar as a further inducement.

In view of the company’s

earlier financial difficulties, the discount was probably necessary.
Indeed, the choice of bonds itself is perhaps indicative of the
measures necessary to raise more money.

Why bonds?

Presumably these

men were astute enough to realize that prices were falling during this
period and the bonds would be paid in dollars worth more at the time
of redemption than at the time of sale.

Bonds sold only to stockholders

with generous interest plus an appreciated dollar value, would reward
the men willing to dig a bit deeper for the common interest.

The

$80,000 raised from this sale of bonds was considered sufficient to
cover indebtedness of the company and provide operating funds for six

31During this period, bond sales were a common device used to
raise more money and sometimes to "freeze out" minority stockholders.
There is no evidence to indicate that this particular sale was intend
ed to "freeze out" small stockholders. The generous interest rate
was probably necessary because of the risks involved in a mining
venture which had failed once.

months.

Other recommendations, all of which were accepted, included

reducing all expenses not absolutely necessary, leaving the mill idle
until a stockpile of ore was accumulated, leasing the Montana City
works, and appointing an assistant secretary for Montana to report
directly to the board. 32
L. C. Garnier replaced Gaty as president, and operations were
resumed in Montana with six men employed mining ore.
continued as superintendent in Montana.

James Stuart

Although some ore was recover

ed, the results did not warrant starting the mill, and he suggested
that the mill remain closed until April vÈien shipments could be made
via the Missouri River. 33
In March, 1869, all work at Philipsburg was suspended.

The

company had ordered James Stuart not to operate at a loss and by May,
only he and one other man were employed.

There were enough supplies

on hand for nearly a year, but the lure of placer mining had raised
wages to $U or $$ per day.

Stuart suggested that the mill be closed

until winter when miners could be obtained for $50 to $60 a month.
With the mill and mine closed, Philipsburg was almost deserted.
The mill remained closed during the summer of 1869, and in
August the directors considered leasing it to William Purvine.

The

32Report to the Stockholders of the St. Louis and Montana
Mining Company Submitted at Their Adjourned Meeting Held January 2,
1869 (St. Louis : Dispatch Book and Job Office, 1869TÎ
'
33James Stuart to L. 0. Garnier, January 27, February 6, 1869,
Stuart Le
Letterbook A.
3UJames Stuart to Charles Taussig, May 30, 1869, ibid.
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lessee was to take all supplies, wood and material on hand at current
market value in Montana.

New machinery could be installed, but the

company reserved the right to purchase the machinery later at its
actual cost.

In September, Purvine leased the mill for a reported

sum of $20,000 a year.
Meanwhile the company's property at Montana City had been
seized for debts, and a representative was sent to that place to pay
the debts and lease the works with the stipulation that ore owned by
the company would be processed.

Active operations by the St. Louis

and Montana Mining Company at Montana City ceased.
Mineral production in Montana declined during 1869.

Raymond

observed that no fixed process for milling ore at the James Stuart mill
had been developed, with the amount of salt and type of chemicals con
stantly being varied in an attempt to discover the best method of
recovering silver.

The mill was idle awaiting repairs.^?

Certainly

the company had made no profit during the year.
Nor was Purvine making a profit doing custom milling, and James
38

Stuart thought the company would certainly fail early in IS7 0 .

The

mill ran intermittently during the year, and when Purvine's lease

^^Charles Taussig to Hauser, August 11 and September 21, I8 6 9 ,
Hauser Papers. The Helena Herald, October 7j I8 6 9 , p. 8.
^^S. W. Barber to Hauser, October lU, I8 6 9 , Hauser Papers.
James Stuart to F. Kennett, November 5j 1869, Stuart Letterbook A.
37R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines and Mining (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1 8 7 O), pp. 7, 2^U, 276.
n O

James Stuart to Hauser, March 5, 1970, Stuart Letterbook A.
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expired, the company replaced James Stuart with a "Captain" George
Plaisted, formerly of the Cable mine.

The mill was started on Hope

lode ore and the company attempted to procure custom work at $2^ per
ton.39
Early in I87 I the mill was closed once more,

Plaisted and a

man named Waterbury sought to lease the property, but the offer was
probably turned down.^®

All activity ceased.

Although a small profit

may have been made by leasing the mill during I87O, a loss was- no
doubt incurred during I8 7 1 .
Early in 1872 the mill process was changed as far as practi
cable to dry crushing, with furnaces and a drying kiln constructed by
lessees.

Ores processed during the year were principally from the

Spreckled Trout mine— not owned by the company-— with small quantities
yielding $125 to $190 per ton shipped to Reno, N e v a d a . T h e Helena
Herald said about 150 men were employed in Philipsburg during the
year, indicating that overall mining activity was comparable to 1867Although costs of working ore were said to have been twice what they
should be— the reasons were not stated— the operation was described
as profitable,Montana’s mineral production dropped sharply in
89The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette (Helena, Montana), March I6 ,
1 8 7 0 , p, 2, The Helena Herald (Helgia, Montana), December ^, I8 7 0 ,
p, 3 .
^^Dance to Hauser, February 2U, F, Kennett to Hauser, May 1,
and J. H, Brown to Hauser, August 31, I87 I, Hauser Papers,
^^R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines and Mining in the States and
Terri tories West _of the Rocky Mount ains (Washington; Government Print
ing Office, 1 8 7 3 ), p. 3.
^^The Helena Herald, August 1, 1872, p, 6,

-181872, perhaps this drop indicated that the territory was in a trans
itional stage between simple placer mining for gold and the more
sophisticated mining methods that followed.
During the year, Felix MeArdie came to Montana to inspect the
work done.

He reported that ore taken from the Comanche lode was too

poor to show a profit, and although $25,000 had been expended on the
Hope lode, the work was haphazard at best, resulting in no improvement.
The company had achieved a gross profit of $11 )
4 ,0 0 0 from crushing 952
tons of ore in 170 days of operation by the mill.

After expenses of

about $6U,000 were paid, a net profit of some $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 remained.
McArdle concluded that an expansion of the mill to handle more ore was
the remedy needed.

He estimated the ore at $25 per ton assay value,

but because the present mill could extract only seventy per cent,
expenses for milling were three dollars more than the recovery value
of about $1 7 .5 0 in silver bullion per ton of ore.

In order to reduce

milling costs, McArdle recommended a $16,000 expansion of the mill.
He also urged the procurement of suitable equipment for prospecting,
the mining of at least a thousand tons of ore before the mill was
started, the shipment of Montana City ores to Philipsburg for pro
cessing, and erecting a mill at Montana City if necessary.

Total cost

was estimated at $201,000.
McArdle said it was impossible to pay holders of the first
mortgage bonds.

To refinance the venture, he suggested the creation

of a new corporation called the Hope Mining Company with capital
stock of $U00,000 divided into 8,000 shares with par value of $50,
For each $50 in cash received, $100 in stock should be issued.

The

-19holders of the first mortgage bonds would receive two dollars of
stock in the new company for each one dollar in bonds held, plus
)^
interest to September, 1872.
The company decided to reorganize.

A meeting of the first

mortgage bond holders determined that it was impossible to pay the
bonds which were due.

To purchase the property of the St. Louis and
Montana Mining Company, the bondholders organized a new corporation. Uh
The creditors then foreclosed and sold the company property.

In

January, 1873, a notice of public sale of the entire holdings appeared
in the Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette. The company had failed.
Reasons for the failure are not hard to find.
was a new industry in the United States;
made in Nevada in 18^9.

Silver mining

the first great strikes were

Processing methods were poor, as indicated by

the UO per cent recovery rate when the James Stuart mill first opened.
Silver occurred in a variety of formations, each one requiring a pre
cise processing, and the failure of the St. Louis and Montana Mining
Company was partially due to crude processing techniques.
A second reason for failure was the lack of knowledge concern
ing the lodes or veins worked.

The company applied no technique except

Report to the Holders of the First Mortgage Bonds of the St.
Louis and Montana Mining Company (St. Louis: St. Louis Dispatch
Print, 1 8 7 2 ).
^^Gaty to the Bondholders, in Hope Mining Company Papers
(Montana State Historical Society Library, Helena, Montana). Cited
hereafter as Hope Papers.
^^The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette (Helena, Montana), January 21,
1873, p. 2.
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digging to explore ore bodies, and asa result a great deal of money
was spent locating new ore which even then could notbe systematically
exploited because the extent of the strike was unknown.
The geographical location also made mining in Montana a high
cost operation.

Transport of supplies and ore cost $20 per ton by

wagon to Ft. Benton, $20 from Ft. Benton to St. Louis by steamboat,
and $10 to $1^ from St. Louis to the seaboard.

Overseas shipment of

ore for processing cost an additional $15 per ton.^^

Total transport

of ore, if shipped to foreign processing plants, cost $65 to $70 per
ton— more than most ore mined by the company was worth.

New machinery

freighted from the railhead at Corrine, Utah, cost $35 per ton, with
quicksilver from California, and salt from Idaho subject to equally
high rates.
Add to these costs the high wages of laborers lured to pros
pecting and placer mining each summer, the optimum period for mining
and milling, delays in receiving needed supplies and repairs, difficult
communication with the home office, inexperienced management, poor
processing techniques, and one does not wonder that the company failed.
The wonder is rather that the investors wanted to reorganize a new
company to continue mining after 1^72.
The question naturally arises— was this company beneficial or
detrimental to Montana?
tions.

The answer is, beneficial with some qualifica

Although a large amount of money was spent at Montana City,

The Helena Herald, November 1, 1871, p. 2. R. W. Raymond,
Mines of the West, pp. llil, l52. The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette,
June HIT 1^70, p. 2.

-21the territory received little or no lasting benefit from the operation.
Conversely, the Philipsburg operation created a new population center
in the territory and provided at least a rudimentary economic basis
for agriculture, trade and transportation.

In a period characterized

by wild rushes from gold field to gold field, Philipsburg probably
exerted some measure of stabilization on the territory.

A good deal

of skill was also introduced into the territory by men such as Deidesheimer, Steitz and Swallow.

And, finally, the company employed at

least a small labor force for seven years.

As yet, very little mineral

wealth had been extracted from the territory.

On the debit side, it

was not to be denied that silver ore had been extracted, and the early
loss of control by Montana investors was not a jzood omen.
least to this time, Montana probably was a benefactor.

Still, at

CHAPTER II
A NEW CCMPANT BEGINS, 1872-80
In November, 1^72, the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company,
by authority granted in its corporate charter, created 8,000 shares
of special stock worth $U00,000,

This stock was disposed of and the

buyers became a separate corporation, known as the Hope Mining Com
pany.

Felix McArdle, president of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining

Company, became secretary of the new organization, while Charles
Whittelsey exchanged the job of secretary in the parent organization
for that of president in the new company,^
With one failure behind them, the St. Louis capitalists de
cided to retain firm control of the Hope Company.

Not one of the

Montana men associated with the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company
appeared on the list of thirteen directors.

While the men who

originally supplied the impetus for the venture and exercised some
control retained an interest, St. Louis dominated the company com
pletely from this

time forward.

Felix McArdle, who had earlier inspected the company and
recommended the reorganization, returned to Montana to take personal
charge of the enterprise.

Until the middle of I87 U, the company was

concerned chiefly with putting its business affairs in order.

^Montana, Secretary of State.
-
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Copy Book A, p. 1^1.

To save

-23money on patenting expenses, an agreement was reached between the
corporation and Montana claim owners whereby the company patented
claims to eight lodes.

Thus one patent and one fee covered each claim.

After the claims were patented, portions of the Wabus, Horton, Robert
Burns and W. B. Dance lodes were deeded back to Dance while undivided
interests in the Hope, Cliff, Lady Byron, and Comanche lodes were
deeded jointly to W. B. Dance, S. T. Hauser, Granville Stuart, Thomas
Stuart and Rezin Anderson,

Granville and Thomas Stuart had become

heirs to the interest James Stuart had owned following his death at
Ft. Peck, Montana in 1B?3.

2

With this accomplished, the company prepared to begin opera
tions.

B. P- Tilden became superintendent upon the death of McArdle in

the summer of 18?U, and activity was renewed in August after a long
period of idleness.

A year after the panic of 1873, the managers

probably hoped for an early recovery.

The enterprise started slowly,

and after an erratic summer operation which was probably not very
profitable, activity was stepped up slightly in October.^
Information concerning the company in 1%?$ is scanty, but in
April

Tilden said the mines looked excellent, and work increased in

June.

With typical forced hopefulness, the New Northwest proclaimed

that Tilden was "prosecuting work as directed by the company with every
indication that it will continue to abundant success...."^
2

Granville Stuart to Felix McArdle, December 19, 1873, Stuart
Letterbook A.
^The New Northwest (Deer Lodge, Montana), August 27, August 22,
October 2U, October 31, 187U, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3.
^Ibid., June 11, August 27, 1875, pp. 3, 3.
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During the latter months of 18?5 and January IB7 6 , some
improvements were made at the mill while work continued at the mine.
Although Tilden reported that the mine and mill were again operating
smoothly, 18?6 was a mediocre year at best.

The company shipped only

$ 3 0 ,0 0 0 in bullion during the year, according to newspaper reports.
These shipments indicated operations were marginal with little or no
profit gained.^
By early 1877, Granville Stuart, hard pressed for funds, com
plained to Hauser that the company was delaying the patenting of
property in order to steal the claims of Montana owners, and stressed
that no dividends had been paid.^

The accusations were probably unjust.

Certainly the company was in no position to pay dividends, because in
April, Ringeling brought $9,000 in bullion to Philipsburg, converted
it to cash, and returned to pay the employees,

A telegram had been

received instructing him to "stop all work in mines and mill;
charge and pay off the men."

dis-

The accusation concerning property is

not substantiated by any other evidence; Stuart was guessing.

A lack

of sufficient ore probably occasioned the closure, but by September
the mill was running again on low grade ore while exploration at the
mines continued.

This exploration evidently was rewarded, and during

the last three months of 1877 silver bullion worth $56,000 was shipped.

^Ibid., January 7, April lU, August 11, September P, December 8,
1 8 7 6 , pp, 3 , 3, 3, 3, 3 .

^Telegram of G, Stuart to Hauser, March 3O, 1877, Stuart
Letterbook A,
7

The New Northwest, April 13, 1877, p, 3.
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according to the New Northwest. This amount, plus $10,000 in bullion
reportedly shipped earlier, would indicate a gross income of some
$66,000 for the year.

The newspapers, especially those of small towns,

were sometimes overly optimistic, however, and it seems likely that
the amount grossed was somewhat less than the total reported in the
New Northwest. The company probably made little or no profit overall.
David Carson, who became superintendent during the year, may have
been partially responsible for the rather good showing for the last
g
quarter of the year.
The deposit was worked out by early 1878, and in June the mill
was idle once more.

Although the New Northwest proclaimed that a rich

body of ore had been found, a constant cry in the western mining camps,
the mill was not started until December and even then the operations
consisted of reworking tailings.

In an attempt to determine if any

profits could be made by reworking mill wastes, the company used vanners.

A vanner was essentially a wide rubber belt running over pulleys

with a side shake.

A stream of water, flowing down the belt, washed

light minerals away from heavier ones, in effect mechanized placer
mining.

Bullion valued at $27,000 was shipped in 1878, less than half

the amount shipped the year before.

If the New Northwest was not

overly optimistic in calculating the value of ore milled during the
year, the mill processed only about UOO tons.^

It would be difficult

g
Ibid., September 7j October 19, November l6 , December 21,
January 19, 1877, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3, 3.
9
Ibid., June 7, December 13, February 22, I8 7 8 , pp. 3 , 3 , 3 .
Total bullion shipped of $27,000 divided by $70 per ton value indi
cates 3 8 5 .7 tons milled. This figure was rounded to UOO tons.
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to show even a modest profit from this scale of operations, and
although no definite conclusions can be drawn from these incomplete
data, it is possible that the company again lost money.

But the

Bland-Allison Act was passed in I 8 7 8 , and at the year’s end the out
look for silver had improved.

In addition to increasing the demand

for silver, this act made silver certificates, backed by a set amount
of the white metal, equal in value to gold certificates even though
the latter metal was more valuable.
The following year was not profitable even though the outlook
for silver had improved.

During the early months of 1879 the vanners

continued to work while extensive prospecting was carried on at the
mine.

The reworking of tailings was unprofitable, however, and

superintendent Clark decided the tailings should be reprocessed by
the mill instead.

A contemplated change from wet to dry crushing

was apparently discarded with the discovery of a new deposit late in
the year-

This new ore from the Cliff claim, together with normal

wear on machinery, was probably responsible for improvements in the
form of new settlers and pans installed in October.

Even though the

mill ran on tailings for several months and an ore strike on the Cliff
claim was reported, no shipments of bullion were reported, the lack of
shipments suggesting that the company incurred a loss for the year’s
operation.

Positive gains were made in the form of better knowledge

of the ore bodies, improvements in the mill, and a better knowledge
of milling techniques.

^^Ibid., April U, May 9, June 6, October 2U, 1879, pp. h, 3,
3, 3.
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Some perspective regarding the financial condition of the
company at this time may be gained from the letters of Granville
Stuart.

Early in 1879, he said that although he had offered to sell

his stock at UO per cent of face value, no one -would purchase it.

Late

that same year, however, he wanted to buy stock belonging to the W. B.
Dance estate at 30 per cent, and finally bought the stock at about 37
per cent of face v a l u e . S t o c k in the Hope Company was apparently
worth nearly UO per cent of its face value in spite of five years'
operations which are best characterized as marginal.

This is rather

remarkable, considering the violent fluctuations in many mining stocks,
and is perhaps something of a testimonial to the stability associated
with the St. Louis investors.

In addition, the company possessed a

very good mill, several promising claims, and a demonstrated ability
to sustain operations over a period of some thirteen years, a consider
able achievement compared with the short lives of many mining companies
of the peri od.
The following year is almost lost in obscurity.

Only one mention

of the company was made by the New Northwest, in February of 1880, and
this was a report that the mill was running steadily on Hope ore. 12
The Montana owners tried to sell their interest in the Hope claim lode,
but apparently failed. 13

At the time, partial interest in the Hope

Stuart to George W. Irvin, between January 27 and March 10,
and October 10, 1879, Stuart Letterbook A.
12

The New Northwest, February 13, 1880, p. 3.

^^G. Stuart to Anderson and T. Stuart, February 19, 18^0,
Stuart Letterbook. Copy. (Microfilm copy in Montana State Historical
Society Library, Helena, Montana). Cited hereafter as Stuart Microfilm.
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claim was owned jointly by Hauser, Granville Stuart, Thomas Stuart,
and Rezin Anderson.

It is not possible to judge whether the company

made a profit or incurred a loss in i860, and at the end of the year,
only two mines were operating at Philipsburg— the Algonquin and Hope.
Philipsburg's population had increased from ^9 to 299 during
the period 18?0 to I 88 O, and the Hope Company was the only mining
venture in the area which has spanned the decade and was still in
active operation.After the reorganization in 18?2, the company
spent most of the time up to 1880 attempting to unearth a body of ore
that would provide a steady supply for the mill, and following two
years of marginal operations, the ore ran out in 1877-

A new supply

was found later that year, but by I878 this deposit was also depleted.
While exploration went on, the company attempted to recover silver
from the tailings by working them with vanners, but the operation was
not profitable and had to be abandoned.

Ore uncovered in the Cliff

lode during 1879 probably was exhausted during that or the following
year.

The period was only moderately successful for the Hope Company,

with the years 1875 to 1877 the best of a rather poor lot.
In 1877 the company was made aware of the fact that bullion
actually on the property at the time of the territorial property
assessment was taxable as real property.

The Montana superintendent

was apparently ignorant of this application of the revenue act of 1^72
when he advised Gaty that the sheriff and county assessor had appeared

^Albert Blumenthal, Small Town Stuff (Chicago;
Chicago Press, 1932), p. 23.

University of
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to seize the property for sale to pay "what they call taxes on
b u l l i o n . S w i f t l y the property was impounded on March 21, 1^77 and
advertised for sale on March 28.^^

The case was contested, albeit

weakly, by the company, and the court held that bullion was taxable as
property under the revenue act

of 1872.

Thus the principle was estab

lished that in addition to a one per cent tax on bullion passed in
1866, mininp companies were subject to property tax on the bullion
held at the time of the territorial tax assessment.

^^O’Bannon to Gaty, March 21, 1877, Hauser Papers.

^%bid.
^'^Hope Mining Co., v. Kennon, 3 Montana 35 (l880).

CHAPTER III
THE THRESHOLD OF SUCCESS, 18^1-83
Operations appear to have been quite successful during 1881,
with both mine and mill working steadily for most of the year although
only one shipment of ore was recorded in the New Northwest ($20,000 in
April).^

One source claimed that during l88l a rich body of ore was
2
discovered which yielded about $360,000.
If the report is true, 18%1

may have been the best year up to this time.
The body of ore discovered at the Cliff lode was exhausted by
mid=l88l and exploratory work was once more under way in September,
In October the mill closed for repairs but soon reopened.

A major

development of the year was the beginning of the Jubilee tunnel, which
became the major means of exploiting the mine.^

In addition to yield

ing information regarding the ore body, this tunnel eliminated the need
to work through a shaft, with attendant savings in time and hoisting
equipment.

Hauser, acting for the Montana owners, concluded a three-

year agreement with the company under which the portions of certain

^The New Northwest, April 29, l88l, p. 3.
2

W. H. Emmons and F. C. Calkins, Geology and Ore Deposits of
the Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana, U. S. Geological Survey Profes
sional Paper No. 78 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1913), p. 213.
^The New Northwest, September 9, October 7, October 28,
November 2^, 1881, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3«
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lodes not owned by the corporation would be worked, seventeen dollars
per ton deducted to cover costs, and the remaining profits divided
between the Hope Company and the Montana joint owners.^

Later, this

agreement caused a great deal of trouble for both contracting parties.
While information is very scarce, it is possible that a profit was
made during I 88 I.
In 1882 the Granite Mountain Mining Company was organized by
St. Louis interests.^

Because no list of the stockholders is avail

able, the precise relationship between this organization and the Hope
Company is not clear, but some degree of association-effected through
an interlocking directorate and Frank L, Perkins, a superintendent of
the Hope Company— did exist.
An indication of the relationship is revealed in a letter from
Perkins to the First National Bank of Helena with instructions concern
ing the handling of "our accounts," meaning the accounts of the Hope
and Granite Mountain companies,

Perkins also told the bank that when

signing checks for the Hope Company he signed as superintendent, while
he signed Granite Mountain Mining Company checks as "in charge."^

The

bank was apparently having some difficulty in keeping the accounts
separate.

It is also interesting to note that the Granite Mountain

Mining Company paid Perkins’ salary during July, August, October,
November, and December of 1882, while he was conduting business for

^Hauser to Gaty, July 1, I88 I, Hauser Papers.
^Montana, Secretary of State.

Copy Book H, p. 729.

^F. L. Perkins to E. W, Knight, July lU and July 3, 18^2,
Hope Papers.
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the Hope Company during the same period.

7

The Hope Company probably had one of its more successful years
in 1 8 8 2 . The New Northwest said in April that the mill had been run
ning steadily since the beginning of the year, and further expansion
Q
increased the number of stamps to twenty at the mill.
Montana
expenses were $7,200,

$9,600,

$7,900, and $10,000 for January,

March, April, and August, respectively— a scale of operations that
would probably not have been maintained unless profitable.^
The Montana joint owners of land leased to the Company became
concerned about non-receipt of royalty payments during the year, and
they engaged Charles Clark--former superintendent of the Hope Company—
to approach the corporation about this matter.Apparently because
the Company still did not act, George W. Irvin proposed to Hauser thaf
they litigate their claims, saying that a jury in Deer Lodge would be
disposed to favor them over the Hope Company,Although the case
could possibly have been carried to the United States Supreme Court on
a plea of diverse citizenship of

the parties, mining companies of the

^Statement of Cash Account, July 21 and August 23, 1882, in
Granite Mountain Mining Company Papers (Montana State Historical Society
Library, Helena, Montana), Cited hereafter as Granite Papers. Perkins
to Knight, August 2, October 25, November 22, December 26, 1882, Hope
Papers.
^The New Northwest, April lii, 1882, p. 2.
^Perkins to Gaty, January (?), March 10, April 12, August 2,
1 8 8 2 , Hope Papers.

^^Perkins to Gaty, June 18, 1882, ibid.
^^Irvin to Hauser, July 12, 1882, Hauser Papers.
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period incurred enough expensive litigation without seeking disputes,
and the Company belatedly issued a statement to the Montana joint
owners showing that 290 tons of ore with an assay value of 7,330 ounces
of silver had been mined from the leased portion of the Hope lode
1p
during November through December, 1881, and January, 1882.
The
statement was issued in August, 1882, even though Gaty had written
Hauser a month earlier that no good ore had been f o u n d , W h i l e
Gaty may not have known how much ore had been mined when he penned the
letter, it appears quite unlikely that the information was unavailable
in St. Louis,

Payment of the royalties was even later in coming.

Not

until January, 1886, did the joint owners receive $2,600 for mining
operations conducted from l88l to I 8 8 3 , and the payment was extracted
from the company only after a good deal of bickering.^
By early I883 the ore "played out" once more, and, with the
mill under repair,

an old mine was explored for paying deposits.

In

May a systematic search for ore began with a diamond drill— the first
such machine used in Montana,

With the new device, test holes were

drilled in a systematic pattern to determine the location, extent, and
depth of ore bodies.

This was a great improvement over the previous

method of digging tunnels and shafts by hand with no real knowledge of
the geological formations.

The drill also permitted systematic ex

ploitation of a strike after the ore was discovered.

12

In June the mill

Statement of Ore Extracted and Milled from Ground Leased from
Messrs. Hauser, et ai, August 1, 1882, Hope Papers.
^^Gaty to Hauser, July 25, 1882, Hauser Papers,
^Receipt, January, 1886, ibid.
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was operating again with diamond drill exploration continuing.
The opening of the Northern Pacific Railroad— at Drummond, some
26 miles north of Philipsburg-“Was a major event of 18%3.

Some appre

ciation of the impact the railway had on transportation costs is shown
in the reduction of the price of salt (used in the chloridation process
at the mill) from $55 to $25 a ton delivered at Drummond.

Although

transportation costs remained a problem, the opening of the railroad
to Drummond greatly improved access to the mines.
While the company's profits may not have been large during 1”83,
the introduction of an efficient and systematic method of exploration
was a large step forward and allowed the company to begin a period of
greater prosperity.

The "free silver" boom had begun and prospects

for silver mining were considerably improved.

After the passage of

the Bland-Allison act, it appeared that legislation favorable to silver
would continue to help hold up prices through large government pur
chases.

As long as the government was willing to purchase a set

number of ounces of silver at a fixed price, silver prices could hardl;y
decline.

And with a number of territories, all in the West, to be

admitted to the Union, the strength of the silver advocates would
probably increase.

^The New Northwest, May 25> July 13, 1883, pp. 3, 2. For a
description of a diamond drill, see Robert J. Lewis, Elements of
Mining (2d ed; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., I9EI), pp. 125-31-

CHAPTER IV
SUCCESSFUL YEARS, 188U-9U
The period l88 U through l89U was perhaps the most prosperous
of the entire life of the Hope Company.

With the use of the diamond

drill for exploration, the supply of ore became less of a problem than
it had been.

The two years of largest production were 1892 and 1893?

and although silver prices declined after I89 O, the company showed a
handsome profit.

The panic of 1893, the repeal of the Sherman Silver

Purchase Act, and the effects of greatly increased world production of
silver contributed to a sharp drop in sil-ver prices.

The company res

ponded by curtailing mining in I89 U, and from that time forward activity
gradually decreased until all operations were finally abandoned at
Philipsburg.
The large sum of money spent on development in 1%91— possibly
in a frantic search for ore after the Sherman Act of I89 O— led to the
two most prosperous years, 1892 and 1893.

In its best year (1892) the

company produced over U00,000 ounces of silver, grossed $381,000, paid
$5 0 ,0 0 0 in dividends, and established a reserve fund of $100,000.

The

period I88 I4 through I888 was also successful, with the company probably
averaging about $50,000 per year in dividends.

The worst year was

1 8 9 0 , when the company lost $2 U,0 0 0 , but the era was one of prosperity

for silver mining and for Philips burg. Philipsburg's population grew
from 299 in I88 O to 1,058 in I89 O and Granite, a sister town, had an
-3 5 -
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even larger population— 1,310 in 1890.^ During 18R1| to 189^, the
Philipsburg area was known as one of the largest silver producing
areas in the world, a title it lost in 189U and never regained.
The Hope mill (formerly James Stuart mill) operated for a total
of 188 days in 188U crushing about U,900 tons of ore at a cost of
about nine dollars per ton.

This cost of milling is quite high com

pared with later years— probably because of the low content of
silver and the complex nature of the ore-— but much lower than the
$25 a ton cost in the i860’s.

Siller commanded a good price, however,

and the company disbursed more than $56,000 in dividends during the
year.

The ore found in the Hope, Comanche, and Emma mines was ex

hausted and further exploration failed to uncover new ore except on
the Potosi claim.

As a result, the company again passed tailings
2
through the mill when it would otherwise have been idle,
Frank L.
Perkins resigned as superintendent of the Hope Company to become
superintendent of the Granite Mountain Mining Company, his employer
since July, l88U, and was replaced by George H. Babcock.^
In 1885, the mill pounded away for 295 days crushing about 8,200
tons of ore which Babcock described as poorer than ever.

This poor

quality resulted in a large amount of ore being milled at high cost
and may have induced the company to install a new boiler at the mill
which saved twenty cords of wood per week.

A deposit discovered by

^Blumenthal, on,cit.. p. 23.
2

The New Northwest, March 21, 188U, p. 3»

^Perkins to Hope Company, November 28, 1^8h, Granite Papers.

-37the diamond drill looked promising enough to begin sinking a shaft
225 feet deep, the deepest on Hope Hill.^

A number of monthly "estimates of funds" appeared during 18#5«
It seems that most business functions of the company were performed in
St. Louis, with receipts from bullion sales deposited in the Hope Com
pany account in a St. Louis bank.

The Montana office submitted a

monthly estimate of funds required for mining and milling operations.
After the St. Louis office had transferred the money to the First
National Bank of Helena in Montana--a bank owned by Hauser— the Montana
office at Philipsburg drew on the Helena bank for operating funds.
Montana expenses for the year varied from $8,000 to $9,600 per month,
averaging about $8,700.^ At $8,700 a month, these data indicate about
$10^,000 as Montana expenses for the year.
cluded in this estimate, however.

All expenses were not in

To this figure was probably added

the cost of supplies purchased in St. Louis for mining operations,
raising the total of local expenses to $117,000, as shown in the annual
report.

A second explanation for the discrepancy between the estimated

and reported total is that the fiscal year did not coincide with the
calendar year.
Operations for 1885 were probably not very successful, and by
early November the mill stood idle with the labor force cut to six men.
It is not surprising that during poorer periods the Company reduced

^Babcock to Hope Company, undated (October, 18^5?), Hope Papers,
^Estimates for Funds, January, February, March, May, June, July.
August, October, November, December, 1885, Hope Papers.
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the labor force as a first step toward economy.

During 1885, wages

constituted about 68 per cent of total Montana costs.

Haulage of

quartz and wood to the mill made up sixteen per cent, and supplies
accounted for about eight per cent of Montana expenses.

With a reduced

labor force, the Company began to sink the Potosi Shaft No. 2 in Decem
ber searching for ore.^
Ore, which the New Northwest proclaimed was "of excellent
quality and abundant quantity," was struck in the Potosi Shaft No. 2
in January, 1886, but the newspaper's sanguine statement was not borne
out.7 In the same month that ore was discovered, the mill closed down
O
once more.
With the ore body worked out, levels were driven out from
the shaft in the following months and enough new ore was uncovered to
keep the mill in almost steady operation for the rest of the year.

Ore

quality was poor, however, averaging only 17.3 ounces per ton recovered
at the mill and expenses were high— $10,000 for the new shaft and hoist
and $56,000 for running levels and drifts.
Company lost about $17,000 for the year.

From this activity, the
Estimated expenses were

$1 3 0 ,0 0 0 balanced against $llU,000 received from bullion sales.^
Possibly because of the poor year preceding, W. W. Adams was
appointed to succeed Babcock as Montana superintendent in 1887-

Ore

in the Potosi No. 2 shaft dwindled and attention turned toward the
Silver Chief claim— located at Tower, a small settlement about one and

^Ibid.

Babcock to Taussig, November 3, 1885, Hope Papers.

^The New Northwest, January 8, 1%R6, p. 3^Babcock to Taussig, January 31, I8 8 6 , Hope Papers.
o
The New Northwest, February I8 , December 10, I8 8 6 , pp. 3, 3<

-39one-half miles east of Philipsbnrg.

This claim had been purchased by

the company, worked for a time, and then abandoned.

A new deaft was

dug on the Silver Chief, from which most of the ore was obtained
during the year.

The deposit discovered on this claim was not high

in quality, running about 26 ounces per ton, and a good deal of work
was expended in driving tunnels through barren ground, keeping expenses
high.

To remedy poor results, the Company again administered the medi

cine of a new foreman, and Ballard gave way to L. M e r r i l l . T h e
foreman, or superintendent, occupied a precarious position, with
tenure apparently dependent upon results alone regardless of actual
ability, and failure to show a profit occasioned a quick response by
the directorate.

In fairness to the corporation management, however,

mining enterprises of the period were billed as a sure way to quick
riches, and a year with no dividends often stirred the wrath of the
stockholders who quickly clamored for returns on their investments.
The company mined and milled more than 10,000 tons of ore in
1 8 8 7 , probably the largest amount processed in any one year during the

history of the venture.

A gross income of about .$260,000 was received

at a cost of about $17$,000, leaving a net profit of some $85,000.
From this profit a scant $2,000 were paid in dividends with the re
mainder probably used to cover losses during the previous years and a
portion carried in reserve for future use.^^

Philipsburg was prosper

ous, and the Northern Pacific Railroad extended a branch line to the

^^Ibid., May 5, June I6 , July lU, September 29, December 1,
1 8 8 7 , pp. h, 1, U, U, U.

^^Annual Report for 1887, Hope Papers. In IP87 new articles of
incorporation increased the capital stock to $1,000,000. Montana,
Secretary of State, Book D., p. 339.
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thriving mining center.
During most of 1888 the Hope mill ran op ore from the Silver
Chief, but by May the supply was apparently approaching exhaustion,
and exploration began on the Lady Byron claim.

Prospecting also com

menced on the Field and Check lodes, and a month later new deposits
were found in the Silver Chief which were apparently of a nature which
1p
could best be reduced by smelting.
In addition to running the mill,
the company made use of the new railroad facilities, and in four months
213 tons of ore averaging more than 80 ounces of silver per ton were

shipped from the Silver Chief.

13

The mill ran almost constantly during 1888, crushing about 8,$bO
tons of ore from which about $1^7,000 were received at a cost of
$1 6 1 ,0 0 0 . The company paid $50,000 in dividends, it would seem, how
ever, mainly from profits made in 188?.^

Although the year was poor

from a financial standpoint, the Company had conducted extensive ex
ploration and gained some better knowledge of the mineral deposits.
The first union also appeared in 1888.

In October the Granite Miners'

Union was formed with a membership of 200 men and soon became the
strongest organization in the community.

The union had no known

national affiliation, and after the panic of 1893, it performed indif
ferently, lingered until 1910, and quietly died because it could

12

.

'The Philipsburg Mail (Philipsburg, Montana), May 17, June 28,
1 8 8 8 , pp. 3 , 1 .
13

Annual Report for 188^, Hope Papers.
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perform no necessary function during the long depression when unions
were in a very poor position to make demands on manag em e nt ,L a te
in the year a discovery at the Porter lode, running 79 ounces per ton,
was claimed, but the glimmer of precious metal existed mainly in a
newspaper editor's eye.
The mill operated only about half the time during 1889,

It was

closed down in May because of insufficient ore, operated for a short
time in September, and then probably closed once more.

Exploration

work at the mine continued although the labor force was reduced by
half in May, increased in September, and then reduced once more. 17
The Company sustained a loss of about $2h,000 in l889.

When

the deposits in the Silver Chief and Porter lodes ran out, a lack of
sufficient ore— a chronic problem— plagued the Company again.

A por

tion of Silver Chief ore was again shipped out for smelting, and
although silver prices dropped slightly, they still averaged 93*5
cents per ounce— sufficient incentive to silver men.

There is no

evidence that the directorate responded to the admission of the sister
states of North and South Dakota, Washington, and Montana in 1889 even
though these states would add eight new senators and help shift the
balance of power in the upper house of Congress,
Unfortunately, no annual report for 1890 is available, but with
the admission of Idaho and Wyoming the directors must have realized

^^Blumenthal, op, cit,, p, 69,
1888, p, 1,

The Philipsburg Mail, October U,

^^bid., December 13, 1888, p, 1,
^'^Ibid,, May 9, September 19, I8 8 9 , pp. 1, 1,
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that silver’s political position was greatly enhanced.

Because of the

loss in the previous year, president John C. Porter discharged W. W.
Adams as superintendent in February, and the following month several
men were at work on the Jubilee tunnel under the new superintendent,
N. B. Ringeling— vrfno was appointed in April.

"I A

Exploratory work prob

continued during most of I89 O, but the mill remained idle until
December. 19 The Company ran short of money during the year and Porter
ably

confided in Ringeling that "when the first of this month (December)
came around we had no money.

The banks were in such a condition that

we did not like to offer our paper."

As a temporary expedient. Porter

drew on his private funds for some $14,000 to meet the November payroll. 20

In December ore was being extracted from the Comanche claim

with an enlarged labor force, while the Silver Chief was abandoned—
the boilei* and hoist removed from the shaft. ?1

A loss was probably

sustained for the second consecutive year even though the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act was pushed through Congress and silver rose to
more than one dollar per ounce.
Silver prices were high, and with expectations that they could
be held up with political support from the new Western states, the
company began an intensified search for ore deposits in 1%91— expending

^^Ibid., March 27, 1890, p. 1. Cuno to Porter, February 18, IP90
and Cuno to Ringeling, April I6 , I89 O, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, December U, 1890, p. 1.
20

Porter to Ringeling, December 23, I89 O, Hope Papers.

^^The Philipsburg Mail, December 11, 18, l890,^pp. 1, 1.
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about $25 per ton on mining and development compared with about six
dollars in the two previous years. The search bore few immediate
fruits, however, and with the ore discovered in the older working de
pleted, the mill paused in mid-January for repairs.

A high grade

deposit found in the Cuno shaft in February was not large enough to
warrant starting the mill until a stockpile was assembled, and after a
short run in April, the mill "hung up the stamps" the following month. 22
The Company reduced the mining force and continued to prospect for ore.
When this prospecting failed to uncover any additional supply, work
was abandoned on the Cuno shaft and emphasis shifted to the Jubilee
tunnel — steadily pushed into Hope hill. 23 With no new ore in sight,
president Porter came to Montana in September to inspect the Company’s
operations, and as a result, the Silver Chief was permanently closed
although prospecting continued on the Horton lode and in the Jubilee
tunnel.

In the interests of economy, Ringeling was instructed in

December to cease operations on the Horton lode and discharge the
miners except those working on the Jubilee tunnel.
The mill had operated 116 days during 1^91, recovering about
80,000 ounces of silver that sold for about $85,000.

Costs ran #83^000,

P2
Stevens to Cuno, January 29, 1891 and Ringeling to Porter,
February 9, 17, and April 6, 1891, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, May lU, 1891, p. 1. Ringeling to Cuno,
June 2h, I 89 I and Ringeling to Porter, June 29, 1^91, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, September 10, I8 9 6 , p. 1. Ringeling
to Porter, October 20 and November 17, 1891, Hope Papers.
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giving a modest profit of some $2,000.

From the limited ore deposits

found and the milling of custom ore, the company made enough money to
expand its holdings, defend the present holdings against several law
suits, and continue work on the Jubilee tunnel— no mean achievements.
Although milling costs had not increased sharply, the cost per ton
mined was four times as great as during 189^ and 1889, reflecting expanded prospecting work, ^

Estimates for funds during 1^91 indicate

an average monthly requirement of about $U,^00-for Montana operations,
labor accounting for more than eighty per cent of local costs probably
because of the expanded explorations carried out.^^

This extensive

prospecting, while costly at the time, proved more than worthwhile in
the next two years.
The Company may have been tardy in paying the Montana joint
owners who leased their claims to the corporation.

At least these

persons thought so, and in 1891 they began to press the Company for
payments.

By this time Byron Ballard, former superintendent of the

Hope Company, had been employed by Granville Stuart to protect his
interests.

In August, Stuart warned Porter that a lawsuit would be

instituted if the Company did not make a speedy and satisfactory
settlement for ore taken from the leased ground.

The Company responded

with a statement that Stuart did not believe, and he bitterly called
Porter the "cheekiest old robber" he had ever known.

Stuart had been

2<
Annual Report for 1891, Hope Papers.
Estimates for Funds, January, February, March, April, May,
June, August, September, October, November, 1891, Hope Papers.
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mustering forces for so'ne time preparing an assault on the Company.
A year previously he had written Tom Stuart that he was getting the
"Hope matter" in shape and expected to "tap them heavily before very
long," and he also offered James A. Murray of Butte one-half of any
proceeds in exchange for free legal assistance,

Murray apparently de

clined the offer, and Stuart retained William Scallon of Butte as his
attorney.

Stuart alleged that about 100,000 ounces of silver had been

removed from the ground owned jointly by Montana men and leased to the
Hope Company.

With several other lawsuits threatening, the Company

tried to mollify Stuart and gave him a statement of mining on the
leased ground together with the expenses incurred.
ing him, the statement

Rather than appeas

convinced Stuart that the expenses were padded

to include total Company costs, and the report spurred him to further
action.

Wilson and Gillie, a civil and mining engineer firm of Butte,

surveyed the ground, and after ascertaining the legality of such
action, Stuart seized the property leased to the Company, including
the Cuno shaft. 27

Notices were posted that Stuart had possession of

the ground as a representative of the Montana joint-owners, and armed
guards were posted to prevent trespassers. 28
Stuart's belligerent act moved the Company to submit a detailed
statement to him showing about $1,700 due the Montana joint-owners.

27
G. Stuart to T. Stuart, February 20, I89 O. G. Stuart to
James A, Murray, March 9, 1890. G. Stuart to Porter, August 31, I 89 I.
G. Stuart to Hauser, September 15, 1^91. G. Stuart to Scallon,
October 3, I 8 9 1 , Stuart Letterbook B.
28

The Montana Mining Review, no. 37 (October 21, I8 9 1 ), p. 12.
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Upon a promise he would receive one-fourth of any money paid in the
dispute and one-fifth of the ground each joint-owner possessed, Byron
Ballard, a former superintendent for the Hope Company, acquired a
vested interest in the controversy and joined the Stuart forces.

With

Ballard’s intimate knowledge, the Wilson and Gillie survey, and his
suspicions reinforced by an indiscreet remark by the Company superin
tendent that a good deal of ore had been removed from the leased ground,
Stuart boldly reduced the Company’s cost statement from about $18,000
to about $ 7 ,6 0 0 . The Wilson and Gillie survey did support this reduc
tion.

Stuart’s adjustments showed that about $1|,500 were due the

Montana owners rather than $1,700 offered by the Company and there the
matter rested at the end of I89 I. 29
In spite of a decline in silver prices, 1892 was the most suc
cessful year for the Hope Company because the exploration done in the
Jubilee tunnel finally produced results.

The mill stamps dropped a

total of 256 days and crushed 6,286 tons of ore which produced more
then S00,000 ounces of silver in 1892.

This indicates nearly eighty

ounces of the white metal recovered from each ton of ore crushed, and
at an assumed recovery rate of about 65 per cent, the ore probably
assayed more than ninety ounces per ton at the pit head— the richest
ore yet found.

After expenses of about $l60,000 were paid, the company

declared dividends totaling $50,000 and established a reserve fund of
$100,000 for future emergencies, with the remaining $71,000 probably
held in a working fund or used to repay outstanding indebtedness.^30

29

Stuart to Ballard, November 26, I89 I, Stuart Letterbook B.

^^Annual Report for 1892. Hope Papers,
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The Jubilee tunnel reached some 1,600 feet in length by the end of
1 8 9 2 , with mining activity conducted on a modest scale.

In 1892 Granville Stuart also began mining operations on the
Hope lode for himself and the other Montana joint-owners and during
the period June through August realized a net profit of about $S00.

32

Stuart's modest success, plus the rather ambiguous body of mineral
law which made a mine operation vulnerable to legal attack, prompted
A. A. McDonald to request a survey and underground examination of the
Jubilee tunnel to determine if the Hope Company had transgressed on his
holdings.

McDonald owned the Garnet and Porter Extension lodes which

apparently joined the Jubilee t u n n e l , T h e matter died out after a
time, and a compromise settlement of $2,600 with the Montana jointowners of leased ground ended a year of vexing legal battles for the
Hope C o m p a n y . M o s t of the lawsuits involved ownership of claims, a
development probably resulting from the complicated law of ownership
and the brighter mining outlook after the passage of the Sherman Act
of 1890.
By early 1893 silver prices were falling, and efforts during the
year were directed chiefly toward the mining and reduction of ore

^^ontana. Inspector of Mines. Fourth Annual Report (Helena,
1893), pp. 26-27.
32

Statement of Work on Hope Lode, September 22, 1892, Stuart
Letterbook B.
33
Ringeling to Forbis and Forbis, June lb., 1892.
Porter, July 17, 1892, Hope Papers.

Ringeling to

^^G. Stuart to T. Stuart, May 22, 1892, Stuart Letterbook B.

-asuncovered in the Porter lode.

By this time most of the ore found in

the Jubilee tunnel had been taken out.

The mill machinery worked for

202 days, crushed 5^530 tons of ore, produced 313,000 ounces of silver,
and paid $175,000 in d i v i d e n d s . T h e election of Cleveland, known for
his opposition to the Bland-Allison Act of 18?8, did not bode well for
the future of the white metal, however, and the failure of the Philadel
phia and Reading Railroad on February 20 was an ominous sign.

Astutely

the directorate foresaw the impending storm and on February 23, more
than two months before the National Cordage Company catalyzed the panic
of 1 8 9 3 , Porter told Ringeling to market all bullion "as soon as pos
sible" because of the "great anxiety concerning the future of silver."^
The New Northwest said in June the stamps of the "old reliable" Hope
were "hung up" although the same force was retained at the mine and the
diamond drill was kept busy.

Faithfully, the paper forecast that it

would not be long before the mill was heard again. 37 By mid-year the
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies had failed;
Railroad quickly followed.

the Northern Pacific

But the Hope Company, pausing only shortly

in August, continued to operate with bullion being shipped in every
month except one, and a carload of ore was sent to Tacoma, (Washington)
for smelting, with disappointing results^®

At the close of 1893 the

^^Annual Report for 1893, Hope Papers.
^^Porter to Ringeling, February 23, 1893, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, June 29, 1893, p. 1.
0O

1893.

Tacoma Smelting and Refining Co. to John McIntyre, May 20,
Bullion Shipped Record, Hope Papers.

-

19
:

-

Hope Company had absorbed the shock of the panic, with activity
continued on a scale comparable to the previous prosperous year. 39
Indeed, with the sharp drop of prices, the Company added the Game
Cock, W. C. Bryant, Kaiser, High Oar, Cara Cash, and West Hope lodes
to its holdings, probably as a protection against further lawsuits.
How did the Hope Company survive the wave that engulfed the
Granite Mountain and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies?

All the reasons may

never be fully known, but some are apparent.
The First Annual Report of Montana’s Bureau of Agriculture,
Labor, and Industry contained a table showing dividends paid by Montana
mines.

Data in the report concerning Hope Company dividends are not

entirely accurate, but the total reported is generally correct, and it
is reasonable to assume that data concerning total dividends shown for
the Granite and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies are roughly correct.
These data show dividends paid by the Bi-Metallic Company total
ing 1.5 million dollars from 1890 through 1893 and h.3 million dollars
paid by the Granite Company during those same years.

Both companies

were operated on a much larger scale than the Hope Company, and their
extensive mines and mills required large costs to keep open.

With

large dividends paid, it seems probable that these companies had only
small reserve funds on hand and the general depression precluded the

39Montana, Inspector of Mines, Fifth Annual Report (Helena,
1893), p. U.
UO
/
Montana, Inspector of MLines, Sixth Annual Report (Helena,
1891), p. 79.
^Montana, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, First
Annual Report (Helena, 1893), P» 28?*

-50possibility of raising more money.

Even with a drop in silver prices

below the level necessary for a profit, the Hope Company could run a
considerable time at modest cost while the vastly larger operations
of the Bi-Metallic and Granite Companies could produce very large
debts in a short time.

And it is also possible that the Hope Company,

over its longer history, had adjusted itself to the most economic size
while the Granite and Bi-Metallic may have over extended their acti
vities in the quest for quick profits.
While silver prices continued to fall in I89 U, the mill pounded
away steadily— crushing 7,029 tons of ore in 290 days— justifying
Philipsburg’s faith in its stability.

The Company sold 312,000 ounces

of silver for $186,000, made an estimated $1;1,000 net profit and paid
$75,000 in dividends in the depression year.^^

This was accomplished

either by shipping bullion produced in 1893, reducing the reserve fund,
or both*

With many men unemployed, labor cost declined and the Com

pany seized on the opportunity by expanding the labor force almost 25
. U3
per cent.

While the Company did survive the panic, indeed seemed to fare
quite well, the depression dealt a near fatal blow to silver mining as
an industry in Montana and seriously damaged Hauser.

John W. Hakola,

Hauser’s biographer, believes that the depression began Hauser’s
financial fall.

With Hauser’s extensive interests, any deterioration

^^Annual Report for 189U, Hope Papers.
^^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Sixth Annual Report (Helena,
189U), p. 79.
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in his position must have created financial shock waves felt widely
in Montana.

CHAPTER V
ACTIVITY DECLINES, 1895-1900
The depression which continued to grip the nation in 1895 also
began to affect Hope Company activity, although a lack of high quality
ore aggravated the problem.

Some 1,762 tons of ore were passed through

the mill in 7h days, yielding 5 0 ,0 0 0 ounces of silver which were sold
for some $UU,000, and the Company probably showed a net loss of nearly
$U0,000 in 1 8 9 5 . Dividends amounting to $10,000 were distributed, but
this represented profits from the last quarter of 189U and a reduction
of the reserve fund to $50,000.^
The pace quickened again in I8 9 6 , probably influenced by hopes
for a favorable election, as William Jennings Bryan— aided by "Silver
Dick" Bland (of Missouri)— articulately championed the cause of free
silver which, despite Bryan*s able leadership, failed.

The annual re

port for 1896 glumly stated that all operations during the year were
conducted through the Jubilee tunnel, with most of the ore passed
through not worth mining.

Construction of a new hoist on a raise from

the Jubilee tunnel to the surface began, however, and was completed
2
several months later.
Silver prices, which had inched upward in 1895, dipped downward

^Annual Report for 1895. Hope Papers,
2

Annual Report for I8 9 6 . ibid.
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-53following the defeat of Bryan.

The mill, almost as if it could not

believe the results of the election, exerted itself for 250 days in
1 8 9 6 , oblivious to the fact that its days were numbered.

Surprisingly,

the Company fared quite well during the year, sold some 288,000 ounces
of silver— retrieved from 6,265 tons of ore— for $170,000, paid $U0,000
in dividends and increased the reserve fund to $55,000.

The year was

profitable, but not many good years followed.^
Unfortunately, no annual report is available for 1897, but
operations appear to have been comparable to those of the previous
year, although slightly more bullion was shipped,^

Bullion shipments

were made every month, and in spite of a large gross product, the de
clining price of silver made it quite possible that net profit was
about equal to, or slightly less than, that of I8 9 6 . The Company paid
at least four dividends totaling a modest $3,200, and the Montana
property was improved and expanded by the purchase in August of the
Algonquin Company with water rights.^
Byron Ballard obstinately continued to mine in 1897 and provided
some discomfiture for the company.

In April, Porter instructed Ringel

ing "in confidence" to watch Ballard carefully and make sure he did
"not manage in some way to look into our mine."^ Ballard had allied

^Annual Report for 1896, ibid.
^Bullion Shipped Record, ibid.
^Cuno to Ringeling, January 27, July 21, and August 18, 1897.
Porter to Ringeling, May 19, 1897, ibid.
Western Mining World
(August 21, 1 8 9 9 ), p. UU7.
^Porter to Ringeling, April 2I4., 1897, Hope Papers.
is shown as it appears in the original source.
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himself with A. A. McDonald and was mining in the Cnno works at this
time.

McDonald was dissatisfied with the expenses of mining, however,

and in the course of offering his share for sale to Ringeling, McDonald
mentioned that the Hope Company was so close to his ground that the
drills could be heard turning.

Ringeling put a door on the 230 foot

level in the Cuno works, probably to quiet the sound, and Ballard,
angered by the door, began to dig even harder.

A short time later

Ringeling told Porter that Ballard was attempting to apex the ore from
the Cuno shaft, and that a Mr. Fletcher— former foreman of the Cuno
shaft— was working with Ballard.

Ringeling thought that if the ore

did not enter other Hope Company claims they were safe, but if the vein
did cross from the Cuno shaft to other holdings, the Company would have
to prove it was an extension of one of their other ore

veins.^

No

record of an agreement with Ballard is available, and he continued to
mine for several years more.
This was the last year of extensive operations by the Company.
Even though the precipitous plunge of silver prices was momentarily
checked, the long-term outlook for the white metal was dim, and future
activity expanded only in response to small price increases.

The com

pany apparently still had ore to be worked but only when the lure of
profits justified an expansion of mining and milling activities.
Through an indifferent 1898, the mill reduced 3,38U tons of ore
in 150 days, recovering 15U,000 ounces of silver bullion.

Gross sales

were about $101,000, while estimated expenses were about $135,000.

^Ringeling to Taussig, September 27, 1897, Hope Papers.
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Despite this activity, the Company paid $30,000 in dividends in 1898,
apparently by reducing the $55,000 reserve fund.

Extensive prospecting

was carried on in a search for higher grade ore as prices began to
move upward, and prospecting expenses— near $25 per ton— made up oneQ
third of total operational expenses in Montana
And Charles A. Cuno,
secretary for more than ten years, died during the year and was re
placed by W. C. Guels.
With the market somewhat stronger in 1898, the Bi-Metallic
started fifty stamps at its mill in June,^

The operations were appar

ently not successful enough to justify continued work, because by the
end of the year only the Hope Company remained open in the Philipsburg
area.^^

To minimize the cost of separate management, mining, and mill

ing, the Granite Mountain was merged with the Bi-Metallic to become the
Granite-Bimetallic Combination Mining Company, while the Hope continued
to run.^^
Probably because of .conditions in the silver market, the possi
bility of exploiting manganese ore had been investigated in 1897buyers were found. T?

No

In 1898 Ballard, still industriously mining, also

began developing a manganese deposit, but his mining activity continued
O
Annual Report for 1898. ibid.
^The Philipsburg Mail, June 3, 1898, p. 2.
^^ontana. Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, aid Industry, Sixth
Annual Report (Helena, 1898), p. 169.
^^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Tenth Annual Report (Helena,
1898), p. 23.
^^Tacoma Smelting and Refining Co. to Hope Co., March lU, 1598,
Hope Papers.
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Although no one may have suspected it at the

time, manganese was destined to replace silver as the principal prod
uct of the Philipsburg mines.
Operations were further reduced during 1899.

Ores recovered

from the Shapleigh shaft and the Jubilee tunnel were of poor grade and
the large e^q^ense of keeping water out of the Shapleigh shaft prevented
extensive prospecting.

The mill stamps dropped on almost the same

amount of ore as during the previous year in slightly fewer days of
activity.

The proceeds for 1899 were only about $33,000, however,

compared to $101,000 for the previous year.

As in I8 9 8 , a large amount

of the total Montana expenses was spent on prospecting for new de
posits.^
By mid-year the Granite - Bi metallic Company was running at
full capacity, and Ballard continued to extract ore from the Cuno
s h a f t . T h e Hope Company was not so prosperous.

In July a complete

closure was ordered, and the following month President Porter came to
Philipsburg to inspect the mines and mill,^^

Operations began again

in November, although probably on a reduced scale.

The mines near

Philipsburg were described as "scenes of renewed and great activity"

^^Hope Co. to Hope Co., April 13, 1^98, ibid.
^^Annual Report for 1898. ibid.
^^The Philipsburg Mail. May 26, 1599, p. 1.
World. July 29, 1899, p. U6.

Western Mining

^^Hope Co. to Hope Co., July 27, 1899, Hope Papers,
Philipsburg Mail, August I8 , 1899, p. 1.
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Several new deposits were found in 1900,

Except for that found

on the Field lode, however, they were quickly exhausted or too poor in
value to warrant extensive mining operations.

The ore discovered dur

ing the year paid the costs of mining and milling, but the cost of
prospecting was only partially recovered, with the company sustaining
1A
a loss for the year.
Estimated income balanced against costs in
dicates a loss of about $lU,000, but because the judgment is based
upon two estimated figures, it is possible that the loss was somewhat
less.
After a feeble rise the silver market weakened again in 1900
while the Hope Mill lazily reduced U,36l tons of ore in about 175 days,
recovering some 102,000 ounces of the white m e t a l . T h e nation
clearly declared for the gold standard in 1900, and the silver sold
by the Company brought only about $61,000.

Expenses ran more than this

amount, near $75,000, and a net loss was again incurred.

Silver mining

was becoming steadily less profitable, and the end of the Hope Company
was near.

l?Montana, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Extra
Edition of Vçæ Sixth Annual Report (Helena, 1899), p. 21.
^^Annual Report for 1900, Hope Papers.

l^Ibid.

CHAPTER VI
END OF THE HOPE MINING COMPANY, 1901-10
By 1901 the directors of the Hope Company probably knew that
the corporation's strength was rapidly ebbing.

Slowly, almost reluc

tantly, the company began to die, with the hoist closed in February,
the labor force reduced in November, and all life disappearing the
following month.^ Western Mining World remained loyal to the Company,
saying that this was not the first time it had closed, but this closure
was the last.

The mill remained inactive until late 1903, and by that

time the Company had ceased to exist.
Like many other mining corporations, the Hope Company died a
lingering death.

In 1902 the holdings passed to a new corporation

known as the Goodhope Mining Company with John C. Porter and John J,
Taussig of the old Hope Company retaining substantial interest in the
new organization, although control was gradually passing to one Paul A.
3

Fusz,^

Probably to provide continuity, and because no loss of control

resulted, the secretary of the Hope Company was retained in that
position,^

1901,

The Philipsburg works stood idle throughout the year.

^The Philipsburg Mail. February 22, November 8, December 6,
pp. 8, 8, 8,
2
Western Mining World. December li|., 1901, p. 21
^Montana, Secretary of State, Document no. 1987.
\festern Mining World, April 19, 1902, p. 15,
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new company, like its predecessor, was a Missouri corporation firmly
controlled by St, Louis interests.
With renewed vigor the Goodhope Company set to work at Philips
burg, and the residents heard the mill pound steadily from 1902 until
mid-1 9 0 6 , when the company paused to reorganize once more.

As if

hoping to recapture some of the prosperity the enterprise had once
known, the newborn corporation was again styled the Hope Company.
A. B. Ewing reappeared as a director of the reorganized venture— he
had sat on the boards of both the Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies—
as did Paul A. Fusz, former director of the Bi-Metallic Company.

John

C. Porter, who had guided the Company fortunes for more than a decade
(1 8 9 0 through 1 9 0 0 ), was gone, and the ownership of his vice-president,

J. J. Taussig, was reduced to one share.^
The reorganization was a tonic but not a cure for the ills be
setting the company, and although the new directors managed to move the
rusting corporate machinery during the summer months of 1907 and 190%,
proceeds from both years were extremely small.
one report of bullion shipped appeared.

After these dates only

In 1909 the company shipped

five bars of bullion, probably from a final clean-up at the mine and
mill.^
In 1911 the property of the Hope Company passed to the Philips
burg Mining Company, another creature of Missouri, completely owned by
Missourians,

Although Fusz remained as a major stockholder, control

Montana, Secretary of State, Document no, 5975.
'^Bullion Shipped Record, Hope Papers.
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of the new company rested with Max Kotany of St. Louis.^
Company had now completely disappeared.

The Hope

Operations had been curtailed

for two years, and even after the property passed to the Philipsburg
Mining Company, activity was almost nonexistent for some time.

In 1912

the Montana Inspector of Mines reported that operations during the
previous two years had been done by lessees who had confined their
activity to prospecting or working on pillars of ore left by the
O
earlier mining ventures.
One authority observed that the final phase
in nearly all the Western mining camps was an era of leasing after the
mines had reached the point where operation by a company was no longer
profitable.^

The Hope had reached that point.

Silver mining was no

longer profitable in Montana, and exploitation of the white metal
ceased to be a major industry in the state.

^Montana, Secretary of State, Document no. 6829.
^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Report for 1911-1912 (Helena,
1912), p. 6a.
^Theodore J. Hoover, Economics of Mining (3d ed.; Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 195U), p. 136.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The St. Louis and Montana Mining Company's mode of business
operation is not known.

With its business office located in St. Louis

and most funds drawn from there, it seems probable that a good deal of
control was attempted from that city.

An executive committee with some

discretionary powers did exist in Montana, however, and day-to-day con
trol was probably in the hands of that committee.

The St. Louis office

appears to have conducted financial business with its Montana committee
through S. T. Hauser, while James Stuart was in charge of mining opera
tions at Philipsburg.
With the establishment of the Hope Mining Company in 1R72, a
new method of conducting business evolved with St. Louis interests
taking firm control of the company.

Although the first evidence of

this new method did not appear until the early lP80's, it seems likely
that the change accompanied the 1872 shift of control.

James Stuart

had left the company before the reorganization, and the superintendent—
with his tenure dependent upon continued succèss-was appointed by St.
Louis from that time on.
Under the new system almost all business was conducted by the
home office.

Bullion was shipped to the Chicago and Aurora Smelting

and Refinery Company, and the product from smelting was forwarded to
New York,

There the silver was sold by the American Exchange National
-

61

-

—62—
Bank, and the proceeds

credited to the Hope Mining Company account

with the State Savings

Bank of St. Louis,^

A monthly estimate of funds required for operations, together
with a detailed report of mining and milling activities, was forwarded
to St. Louis from Montana.

The necessary funds were transferred to the

Hope Company account with the First National Bank of Helena, Montana,
against which the Montana superintendent could draw.

St. Louis also

watched reports of mining and milling activities closely.

From these

reports and their own financial accounts, the home office exercised
continuing effective control and provided detailed guidance for the
Montana superintendent.

Only those supplies that could be procured

locally were purchased in Montana.
timber, coal and wood.

In this category were lumber and

Most other items such as salt, quicksilver,

powder and miscellaneous tools and
by St. Louis for the Montana office.

supplies wereprobably purchased
Evidently the entire procedure

was designed to maintain the maximum possible control in St. Louis.
While this system had merits in that the superintendent was not bur
dened by accounting, it also had serious liabilities.

At times,

although perhaps only when operations were marginal, the superintendent
seemed unaware that the company was incurring a loss until he learned
otherwise from the home office.
Although a bookkeeper was employed in Montana, accounting was
done primarily in St. Louis.

At the end of the fiscal year an inven

tory list was forwarded to the city office.

^Cuno to Ringeling, June 29, 1B95»

This list was balanced

Hope Papers.
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against home office ledger accounts and Montana advised of the entries
necessary to balance the books.

After receiving the adjusted accounts

and additional financial information from St. Louis, the Montana book
keeper drew up a report concerning operations for the year.

This report

was forwarded to St. Louis where the balance sheet and annual report to
the stockholders were drawn up.

The method was cumbersome and costly.

One writer estimates that an additional cost of 20 to 33 per cent of
operating profit is necessary to maintain a city office.

This esti

mate appears high for the Hope Mining Company, but the city office may
have accounted for more than sixteen per cent of total expenses.

The

economy of a single office was sacrificed for greater control by the
home office.
The pattern of the Hope Company’s shift of control is somewhat
characteristic of Montana mining ventures.

Claims, of course, had to

be discovered by persons present in Montana. With the exception of
simple placer operations, however, these claims could be exploited
only after considerable capital investments had been made.

Investment

capital of the necessary magnitude did not exist in Montana in most
cases.

For this reason Montana claim owners often acquired capital

from financial centers of the country— New York, Philadelphia, San
Francisco and, in this particular case, St. Louis.

In most cases

control followed the capital, with Montana claim owners gradually
losing control of the mining venture.

In the case of the Hope Mining

2
For further data on foreign corporations in Montana during
the territorial period, see a forthcoming thesis being written by
Patrick McLatchy at Montana State University, Missoula, Montana

“é U —

Company the loss of control occurred in 18?2 with the reorganization
of that year.
There have been constant complaints that Montana was plundered
by eastern capitalists.

One must concede, however, that investment

capital performs a vital function in the productive process and should
earn returns in proportion to D^iat it lends to production.

The crucial

question is not the right to a return from capital invested, but
rather a quantitative "how much."

This quantitative judgment is espe

cially important in regard to an extractive industry like mining where
mineral resources are removed and cannot be replaced.

Certainly the

major portion of the profits from the Hope Mining Company, like many
other mining ventures in Montana, was realized by outside investors.
Viewed generally, and also specifically in regard to Montana, it
is questionable if the mining of precious metals ever repaid the total
costs involved in the industry.

Because it is impossible to assign

finite values to such things as the time and labor expended, lives
lost, misery endured, and greed and crime associated with the search
for gold and silver-one can perhaps pass over the moot question of
whether the mining of precious metals ever repaid total costs and
consider if outside capital invested in the Hope Company compensated
for the loss of local control.
On the credit side, we have already mentioned that the St. Louis
and Montana Mining Company provided an economic base for other indus
tries such as agriculture, lumbering, trade and transportation.

This

Company also brought some talented men into the territory with at least
one, G. C. Swallow, who became Montana’s first state inspector of
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mines, remaining.

The St, Louis and Montana Company also added some

stability to the "boom and bust" economy of the territory.
The Hope Company displayed some of these same good points.

Cer

tainly it was one continuing source of tax revenue for Deer Lodge and,
later. Granite county for more than forty years.

Although the state

and local taxes paid were probably not a great source of income for
government, the company also met a payroll— at least intermittently—
for nearly half a century.

But there is little reason to credit the

Hope Company with bringing new talent into Montana.
On the debit side, the loss of control meant that Montana faced
a corporation organized and controlled in Missouri with most of the
profits made by St. Louis investors.

The company did indeed spawn and

nurture Philipsburg, yet the town continued to exist after the company
was gone, with little decrease in population.

Agriculture, lumber,

trade and transport were stimulated, but one wonders if these indus
tries would not have come to the Philipsburg area without the Hope
Company.

And if they had come later, they might have been more bene

ficial to Montana.

Certainly if lumbering had been delayed for fifty

years the methods of exploitation would have been quite different.
What if the Northern Pacific had been delayed twenty years?
While the capital necessary to begin the Hope Company probably
did not exist in Montana in the l860’s, investment funds of the neces
sary magnitude (some $250,000 initial investment) would have been
available at a later time.

There is little reason to believe that the

methods and motives of a Montana investor would have been different
from those of a St, Louis investor.

Yet, it is possible that the
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Montana capitalist might have been more responsive to the needs of
Montana, and— if he made money— might have looked to Montana for fur
ther investment of the profits made.
Today the rotting, empty shell of the Granite-Bimetallic mill
stands a mile or slightly more southeast of Philipsburg.

In a small

gulch at the head of Main Street is one small building surrounded by
the rubble that was once the Hope Mill.

Scattered bits of rusted

machinery litter the countryside between these ruins while piles of raw
earth and tailings mark the sites of other mines and mills.

And, less

visible to the eye, indeed almost incomprehensible to the casual visit
or, the miles of tunnels and underground caverns mark the places where
mineral wealth once existed.

While it is impossible to objectively

measure the values involved and reach an unbiased conclusion, the
question arises;

Could Montana have fared much worse?

The benefits

derived locally certainly do not appear to have compensated for the
loss of control.
There are numerous reasons for the failure of the Hope Company,
but the fall of silver prices, gradual at first and then accelerated
after I89 I, was the chief reason.

Although prices determined the

quality of ore from which a profit could be made, the quantity of ore
was also a chronic problem.

Extensive exploration was carried on with

a diamond drill, but the problem of adequate ore deposits was not
really solved until 1892.

And by that time, prices were falling fast.

Milling techniques rose quickly from about UO per cent recovery of
assay value at the mill in the l860’s to about 85 per cent by the mid1 8 8 0 's.

After 1 8 9 3 , however, increases in recovery rates were

-67beginning to level out and could not compensate for falling prices.
Several other factors made mining in Montana a high-cost indus
try.

Geographically the mines were located inland in an isolated area

with high transport costs.

These costs affected not only machinery and

supplies coming in, but also products shipped out for sale.

The long

distance from markets made it impossible, for a time, to exploit other
minerals, such as lead, which were often found with the silver-bearing
ore.

The geographic location also caused delays waiting for necessary

supplies.
The history of the Hope Mining Company in some respects reflects
the history of silver mining as an industry in Montana.
pects it is unique.

In other res

Like many other companies it began with outside

capital and Montana stockholders gradually lost control to the outside
investors.

It began with little technical knowledge and rapidly im

proved its methods.

Yet, by the time the Company had gained the know

ledge necessary for efficient mining, silver exploitation as an industry
in Montana was dying.

In these respects it is like many other companies.

Unlike many other companies, the Hope Company was most success
ful in terms of longevity, lasting for more than forty years.

This

long period of existence, however, distorts the financial picture
somewhat.

Dividends paid between 188U and 1900 amounted to about

$5 0 0 ,0 0 0 , much less than those paid by the giants of Philipsburg, the
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies.

Assuming that all stock was paid up

and a maximum of a million dollars paid in dividends in forty years,
the rate of return on initial capital invested was about ten per cent
per year.

If all estimated capital invested is considered, however.
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the return was nearer four per cent.^

This would be a fair, but less

than spectacular return, especially for a mining venture.

The Company

was not an easy, quick way to wealth nor was it a failure, but rather a
sound, steady business venture.
While an extended discussion of the factors affecting silver
prices is beyond the scope of this study, some mention should be made
of these factors.

Silver had value as a commodity and also as monetary

metal which could be used for fractional coins or backing for currency.
The commodity uses were limited to such items as photographic uses,
mirror making, silverware, and miscellaneous other items,^
tity needed for these items was quite limited.

The quan

Monetary uses of silver

could be expanded through political action incited by currency reformers
and businessmen concerned with the growing needs of trade.
Until 1873 a good deal of silver was used to back modern curren
cies, with Great Britain the only major nation on the gold standard.
In 1873 Germany adopted the gold standard and began to dispose of its
demonetized silver, with the Scandinavian Monetary Conference (Norway,
Sweden, and Deimark) following suit.^

Thus, with world production

^In either case these estimates are based on the assumption
that the original stockholders retained their interests for the entire
life of the Company, It is probable that this was not true, and that
the stockholders of the original company lost money while the persons
owning stock in 1892 and 1%93 may have received a very good return on
their investment.
S. Leong, Silver: An Analysis of Factors Affecting Its
Price (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 193U), p. 38.
^Ibid., p. 2.
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rapidly rising, a number of important nations were no longer consumers
of the metal for monetary purposes, although France, Belgium and Lux
embourg did continue to use simll amounts.
consumers.

India and China were major

The demand of these nations rested to some extent on their

volume of foreigh trade, but India, especially, absorbed an enormous
amount of silver for ornaments.

Coins were often melted down for these

ornaments, resulting in a constant demand for silver to replenish the
monetary supply.^

United States demand also declined when the Coinage

Act of 1873 failed to mention silver and in effect demonetized it.?
With this omission and the panic of 18?3 contributing to falling prices,
it is not surprising that the Hope Company spent several years rearrang
ing business affairs after the failure of the St. Louis and Montana
Company in 1872.
Ihe omission of silver from the Coinage Act of 1873 became a
political issue known as the "Crime of '73»"

When the Specie Resump

tion Act of 1875 eliminated greenbacks as a political issue, the easycredit advocates turned to silver as a political symbol and an
inflationary device intended to reverse the general price decline
which was a marked feature of the age.
cerned in the matter.

Farmers were especially con

Silver satisfied the requirement that there

be bullion backing for currency, insured an expansion of the money

^J. Laurence Laughlin, A History of Bimetallism in the United
States (New York; D. Appleton and Co., 1901), p. 109.
7

Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, The Growth of the
American Republic (Uth ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 19^3),
II, p. 2 I4.5 .

-70supply, and had the backing of silver mine owners and interests.^
In 1878 the Bland-Allison Act was passed over a presidential
veto.

This Act provided that the government must purchase not less

than two nor more than four million dollars worth of silver monthly,
to be coined into silver dollars at the existing legal ratio with
gold.

This purchase for monetary use did not compensate for increased

production, and the price continued to fall.

An international confer

ence held in Paris during I878 also failed to increase the monetary
demand as did several later conferences.

The United States delegate

advocated bi-metallism at the I 878 conference, but only Italy agreed.
France would not consent to bi-metallism. Great Britain sent a repre
sentative who would not commit his government, Germany refused to send
delegates, Russia and Austria were noncommittal, while Belgium, Switzer
land and the Scandinavian states favored gold.^^

A second conference

held in I88 I was equally disappointing.^^
By 1890 the enabling acts of 1889 and I89 O had brought six new
western states into the Union and the balance of power shifted in Con
gress.

Through this shift of power the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of

1890 was passed, with the Hope Company responding by spending a good

deal of money on prospecting for ore.

The Act required the government

g
Ibid., p. 2UI|.
^Ibid.. p. 2U6 .
A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United States.
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915)> PP* 28h-85.
Laughlin, op. cit., p. 2U7.
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to purchase U.5 million ounces of silver each month at current market
prices.

The Act also provided that silver be purchased with Treasury

notes redeemable in gold or silver at tiie Secretary's discretion. 12
A final attempt by the United States to secure international bi
metallism at a conference in Brussels during 1892 witnessed another
f a i l u r e . T h e failure of this conference and the depression of 1°93
caused a sharp drop in silver prices.

Because the Sherman Act provided

that Treasury notes issued with silver backing were redeemable in gold
or silver, gold reserves— for a number of reasons which need not detain
us here— were rapidly drained from the Federal Treasury,

In August,

1893, President Cleveland called a special session of Congress to

secure the repeal of the Sherman Act, and silver prices fell even
l o w e r . I n d i a , a large consumer of silver for monetary purposes had
closed her mints to silver in I89 O.
The Hope Company continued to operate in 1393 even though the
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies— for reasons already discussed—
failed.

Yet, in 1899, the then combined Granite - Bimetallic was more

prosperous than the Hope Company.

The reason was probably the more ex

tensive ore deposits of the Granite - Bimetallic which were also of
better quality.

Although differing in many respects, neither the Hope

nor the Granite = Bimetallic could survive the slow death of silver
mining as an industry in Montana.

By 1912 about seventy-five ner cent

l^Morison and Commager, op.cit., p. 2U?.
^%epbum, op. cit., p.

,

-^^orison and Commager, op ,cit,, p. 2$1,

-72of Montana's silver production was the by-product of copper refining
and a substantial portion of the remainder a by-product of zinc mining,
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St. Louis and
Montana Mining
Co: - 1866
J. How
W. D 'Oench
S. Treat
J.O. Broadhead
S.T. Hauser
W.B. Dance
James Stuart
G.W. Parker
L.M. Kennett
S. Gaty

Table 1
Directors of Selected Mining Companies
1866-1911
Goodhope
Granite Mountain Bi-Metallic
Mining Co.^ Mining Co.^
Mining Co.2
1881
1902
1886
L. Duestrow
J. N.Bofinger J. C. Porter
J. M, Merrell

Hope Mining
Co.’
1872
F.Ringeling^
J. Kirkead
C.F. Meyer
C.C.Whittlesey8
F. McArdle'i^

W.C. Kennett
S. Gaty
E. Harrison^
D.A. January*^
H.J. McKellops
A.F. Shaplgigh
W.L. Ewings
C. Taussig'

Hope Mining Co.5 Philipsburg
Mining Co.
1907
1911
O.J. Wilhelmi
E. S. Orr
J.R. Lucas
J. P. Hartnett
O.J, Olshauser E. Barklage
E.P. Olshauser

!e . Harrison
'j.S. January
H.J. McKellops
A.F. Shapleigh
A.B. Ewing^
A.B. Ewing
J.J. Taussig
C. Taussig ____
C. Clark
C. Clark
L.M. Rumse .11 L.M. Rumsey,Jr
L.M. Rumsey
M. Rumsey!5riiH, Rumsey
C.D. McLure10
^IC.D. McLure
P.A. Fusz^Oy^-ip.A. Fusz
J.H. Dieckman
Max Kotany

N.W. Ewing
A.B. Ewing
J.J. Taussig

A.L. Shapleigh
I
Mark Ewing
J.J. Taussig

L.M. Rumsey,Jr.
H.S. Rumsey

L.M. Rumsey,Jr.
H.S. Rumsey

P.A. Fusz
J.H. Dieckman
Max Kotany

F.D. Fusz
J.H. Dieckman
Max Kotany

TMontana, Secretary of State^ Book A. p. 151. ^Ibid., Book B., p 115-16.
-^Ibid., Book P., p. 86-88.
Ibid., Doc. no. 5975.
Ibid., Doc. no. 6829.
^Ibid., Document no. 1987.
____
___
^Stockholders in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
^Officers of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company
9A James Harrison was a stockholder in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
^’^Tht'se men with D. Jankower formed the Board of Directors of the American Gem Mining Syndicate.
Montana Secretary of State, Book T., p. 106-09.
llphese men plus C. Jagels formed the Board of Directors of the Montana later, Electric Power and Mining
Company, Montana Secretary of State, Document no. 1371.
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Table

2

List of Hope Mining Company Property
and Subsequent

Ownership^

Claim
Check, Cross, Constant,
Comanche, Dashaway,
Field Fraction, Game
Cock, Homestead, High
Oar, Hope Mill Site,
Kaiser, Little Emma,
Prince Imperial,
Porter, Potosi,
Shapleigh, Take All,
Wabus
Cliff No. 2 Extension
East, Durango Mill
Site, Monarch, Nellon
Reservoir Site,
Ora Cash, Taussig,
Seal Rock, Salmon

Subsequent Owners
Philipsburg
Mining
Company

J . C. Yob

Peter Antonelli

Contact
Mines

Cliff No, 2 and No. 5

Taylor Knapp
Company^

Bay Horse and Mill Site,
Durango, Estil, Silver
Chief and Mill Site,
Tariff, True Fissure,
Walter B. Dance,
W. C. Bryant

Moorlight
Mining
Company

Algonquin, Bell,
Dead Horse

Trout
American Mining
Mining
and Metals, Inc.
C ompanv
Miscellaneous Owners

Caledonia, Hope Mill Site,
Lady Byron, Midnight, Sam
Gaty, Reliance, Taussig

Granite County, Montana. Office of the Clerk and Recorder.
Lots and Lands, Book I.
2
All claims except Durango and Estil had intermediate owners
before being acquired by Taylor Knapp Company.

Table 3
Summary of Hope Mining Company Operations
1884-1900
Silver Bullion
Produced
Year (Thousand Ounces)
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900

N,A,

Proceeds
(Thousand Dollars)
N.A, /

121,8

a/

264.0 É/
167.2
.
129.5 5 /

N,A.
79.5
443.3
3 8 4 .0 :^ )
311.7 y,
50.2
287.5
N.A,
,
153.5 ^
62.0
102,3 1/

1 1 9.3 -/
112,3
258.0
157.4
121,0

N,A.
85,0
380.8
306,5
186.0
43.8
170.5

N.A.
100.5
32,6 ,
61, 0&/

^

Expenses
(Thousand Dollars)
N.A.

/

140.5 %
129.5
175.9 ,
161.0 £ /
144.9

N.A.
82,7
.
158.3
153.3 ^
145.0 £ /
83.0
122,7 V
N.A. .
134.7 ^
95.8 5 /
74.5 ^

Dividends
Paid
(Thousand Dollars)
56.5

N.A.
N.A,^/
2. 0É/
50.0

None
N.A.
None
50.0
175.0
75.0
10,0
40,0

N.A,

Reserve
Fund
(Thousand Dollars)
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
100,0

N.A.
N.A.
50,0
55.0

30.0

N.A.
N.A.

None
N.A.

2,0
2.1

'Unless otherwise indicated, data are from Hope Papers, Annual Reports, 1884-1900.
based on reported ounces produced at 98 cents per ounce.
c/The years for which data exist (1889 and 1891) indicate that expenses at St. Louis averaged
about 16,66 per cent of Montana expenses. Except where total expenses were reported (188?, 1889, and
1891) Montana expenses were increased by 16,66 per cent to estimate total expenses.
"^^The Philipsburg Mail, May 2, 1889, p. 1.
if-Estimate

^'^tima.te based on reported proceeds at 93.5 cents per ounce.
/Ounces shipped reported in Annual Reports. Figures for 1884-91 are ounces produced.
^Estimate based on ounces shipped at 59.6 cents per ounce.
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Table 4
Hope Mining Company Bullion (Silver Bars) Shipped Record, 1892-1909
Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Yearly
Totals

N.A.

N.A.

16

74

N.A.

0

14

16

6

1

136

16

17

15

19

16

12

200

7

2

N.A.

N.A.

5

0

0

17

20

20

18

29

22

24

18

26

212

19

20

18

21

26

29

19

25

23

253

15

5

0

8

7

0

0

0

7

6

87

8

5

0

2

4

3

0

6

7

8

4

59

6

4

5

8

3

0

9

0

62

2

7
8

9

13

3
0

4

6

6

2

4

2

3

1

51

1902

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1903

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

14

17

31

1904

13

16

12

8

12

12

14

12

12

4

6

8

129

1905

12

4

8

13

8

8

12

8

8

6

4

2

93

1906

2

0

0

4

8

3

6

0

0

0

0

28

1907

0

5
0

0

0

2

6

6

4

4

2

7

31

1908

0

0

0

0

6

4

8

6

7

6

0

0
n

1909

0

0

0

0

0

5

Year

Jan.

Feb.

March

April

1892

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1893

21

8

1894

19

1895

May

June

July

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

20

19

13

16

2

29

15

9

12

21

3

0

0

0

0

1896

0

7

13

15

1897

17

16

20

1898

20

19

1899

12

1900

8

1901

N.A.

Aug.
N.A.

N.A.

Sept.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

37
5

I
-o
1

*9,

«Oo

yNOHLÙ

PRODUCTION (MILLION OZ.)
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The Hope Mining Company Mine and Mill
Hope Hill is located about one mile northeast of Philipsburg
and is honeycombed with miles of intersecting workings.

The Jubilee

tunnel entered the west slope of the hill at an elevation of about 5,500
feet and was driven to the Shapleigh shaft which was intersected about
5U0 feet from the portal of the tunnel.
feet of drifts and crosscuts were driven.
feet deep.

On the tunnel level about 6,000
The Shapleigh shaft was 570

The Jubilee tunnel intersected the shaft at a depth of about

100 feet, and below this, levels were driven out at depths of about 200,
Loo, and 570 feet.

These levels were connected with the tunnel by

winzes, stopes, and inclines.

After intersecting the Shapleigh shaft,

the Jubilee tunnel continued eastward to the base of the Porter incline
and through it was connected to the Porter workings above.

Through

torturous raises, drifts and cross cuts, the Jubilee tunnel connected
with the Field and Cuno shafts to the southeast and also with the orig
inal Hope Discovery workings.^
The Hope Mill is in ruins today.
stone structure stand

Only portions of the original

at the eastern end of the main street of Philips

burg, testifying to an earlier and more prosperous age for silver mining.
The mill used a pan amalgamation process which was developed in the
Washoe district of Nevada to treat silver ores.

This process depends

upon certain chemical processes and reactions.

The pan was an upright

H.
Emmons and F. C. Galkins, Geology and Ore Deposits of t
Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana. U. S. Geological Survey Professional
Paper No. 78 (Washington; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1913), p.213.
—
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cylindrical vat about 5 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep, made of iron
or wood shod with iron.

A muller, or iron disk, slightly smaller than

the bottom of the vat, moved with a rotary motion mixing and grinding
the ore.
mud.

From this pan the ore went to settling reservoirs as a pasty

Salt, mercury and copper sulphate were "charged" into the pan and

reacted on the silver sulphide and silver chloride.

In the presence of

iron, mercury frees the silver from sulphide and chloride compounds and
forms amalgam.

Iron reduced the mercuric chloride formed to mercury.

Copper sulphate reacted on common salt and, in the presence of iron,
formed cuprous chloride which reacted on silver sulphide and to some
extent on sulpharsenates and sulphantimonates of silver.

Heat, sup

plied in the form of steam to the pans, facilitated the reaction.

After

about eight hours grinding in the pans, the pulp passed to water to
2
facilitate separation of mercury and amalgam.
A diagram of the process used at the Hope Mill is shown on the
following page.

This process remained essentially unchanged throughout

the history of the company.^

^Ibid,, pp, 19h-9^.
^Ibid., p, 19$,
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Schematic Drawing of Process Used by Hope Mill

Seven by ten Blake
Crusher^

Ten Stamps

Settling reservoirs
to thicken pulp
Salt, mercury and
copper sulphate
Mixing floor

Six pans

Three settlers

Ruffled

flume

crusher with one fixed jaw plate and one pivoted at the
top so as to give the greatest movement on the smallest lump.
Albert H. Fay, A Glossary of the Mining and Mineral Industry,
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 83.
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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

A.

Directors of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company
James 0. Broadhead was a former
district of Missouri,
Missouri, a long-time
the law firm of Sharp

U. S. attorney for the eastern
former provost marshall for
state politician, and a member of
and Broadhead

W. B. Dance was a member of the Montana executive committee and also
associated with the firm of Dance, Stuart and Company.
William D'Oench was associated with William D ’Oench and Company and
president of the Franklin Savings Institution.
Samuel Gaty was of the Gaty, McCune and Glasby foundry.
Samuel T. Hauser was a member of the Montana executive committee.
Hauser was b o m in Kentucky in 1833 and went to Montana
with W. B. Dance after working for railroads in Missouri
for eight years as a civil engineer. In 1865 he organized
a bank at Virginia City in partnership with N. P. Langford
and one year later founded the First National Bank of
Helena. Later Hauser owned banks in Butte, Ft. Benton and
Missoula and engaged in almost every conceivable invest
ment venture in Montana. He was appointed Governor of
the territory in 1885 by Cleveland and later became the
first chief executive of the State. For a complete biog
raphy of this important Montana capitalist, see the forth
coming study by John W. Hakola.
John How was presndent of the State Savings Institution, a former
mayor of St. Louis and senior member of the firms of John
How and Sons and of How, Harrington and Company.
L. M. Kennett was a former mayor of St. Louis, cousin of Hauser,
former representative to Congress, and a director of the
Boatman's Savings Institution.
George W. Parker’s business affiliations are unknown,
James Stuart was born in Virginia and went to California with his
father and brother Granville in 1852. In 1857 he returned
to Montana with Granville, joined the firm of Dance, Stuart
and Company and became superintendent for the St. Louis
and Montana Mining Company. He left the Company prior to
the reorganization of 18?2, became an Indian post trader
and died at Ft. Peck, Montana in 1873.

—
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Gram/ille Stuart, as mentioned above, came to Montana in 1^57,
returning from California. In I870 he purchased James
Stuart’s interest in the mercantile business and then
sold the business in 1873• For three years he was en
gaged in mining ventures and then became a stockholder
and bookkeeper at the First National Bank of Helena.
After a short time in Helena, he managed a large ranch
ing venture at Ft, Maginnis, Montana for himself, Hauser,
and A. J. Davis of Butte. He served on the Territorial
Council in 18?2 and in the Territorial House in 1%7S and
and 1 8 7 9 . In I 89 I, after his cattle business had failed,
he became State Land Agent under Governor Hauser and in
I89 U was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister pleni
potentiary to Uruguay and Paraguay. In 190U he became
librarian at Butte and was commissioned to write a state
history of Montana in I9 1 6 . The work was not completed
when he died October 2, 1918.
Samuel Treat was a judge of the U. S. District Court.
B.

Other Stockholders of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company and
Closely Related Corporations
Gerard B. Allen was with the Fulton Iron Works.
S. M. Breckenridge was a collector of customs and former judge of
the St. Louis circuit court.
J. H. Britton was president of the Old State Bank of Missouri and
former cashier of the Southern Bank.
Amos Cotling was associated with Jameson, Cotling and Company of
St. Louis and Cotling and Smith of New York.
C. K. Dickson was a member of the firm of Murdock and Dickson,
Dwight Durkee was a banker,
James B. Eads was a constructor and inventor of gun boats, chief
engineer of the St. Louis Bridge Company, part owner of
the Granby lead mines, and a director of the National
Bank of Missouri.
William L. Ewing was a former president of the Merchant’s Bank and
a member of William L. Ewing and Company.
L. C. Gamier’s other business affiliations are unknown.
James Harrison was with the firm of Chouteau, Harrison and Valle
and the Rolling Mills.
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D. A, January was with the firm of D. A. January and Company.
John S. McCune was a former member of the Gaty, McCune and Glasby
foundry, president of the Iron Mountain Company, and
associated with the Keokuk Packet Company and the Pitts
burg Coal Company.
Felix McArdle was a metallurgist and assayist.
J. J. O'*Fallon’s other business interests are unknown.
Captain A. M. Pike was a large stock dealer and former head of a
banking house in Pike County, Missouri.
F . Ringeling was cashier of the Franklin Savings Institution.
M. Steitz was probably a relative of Agustus Steitz.
G. Taussig was a member of Taussig, Livingstone and Company.
M, Taussig was with the firm of Ahles and Taussig.
John A. Ubsdell was with the firm of Ubsdell, Parr, and Duncan of
St. Louis and New York.
E. Y. Ware was with Belcher’s Sugar Refinery.
C.

Other Persons Affiliated with the St. Louis and Montana Mining
Company
Philip Deidesheimer was b o m in Germany in 1832 and came to Califor
nia via Cape Horn in l85l where he remained until i860.
He then went to Nevada and there devised a method of
"square stoping" which allowed removal of deposits in the
famous Comstock lode. Philipsburg was named for him after
he came to Montana in 1865 to help Steitz at Montana City.
After a short time in Montana, Deidesheimer returned to
California, invested heavily in mining ventures, and lost
a good deal of money. He then managed a gold mine in
Colorado for the Robelings. Little is known of his later
life. For a description of square set stoping, see Robert
S. Lewis, Elements of Mining (2d ed.; New York; John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., ipUl), p. 7U-8U.
G . C. Swallow was born in Maryland and educated at Bowdoin College.
He held the positions of professor of geology, chemistry,
and mineralogy at the University of Missouri, state
geologist for Missouri, and state geologist for Kansas.
After working for the St. Louis and Montana Mining Com
pany, he became the first Inspector of Mines for the State
of Montana.
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Glossary of Mining Terms
Amalgamation-pan - A pan in which the process of amalgamation or
combination with mercury is affected. Used in gold and
silver metallurgy.
Apex - In geology, the top of an anti-clinal fold of strata. This term
as used in United States Revised Statutes, has been the occa
sion of much litigation. It is supposed to mean something
nearly equivalent to outcrop.
Blast furnace - A furnace in which combustion is forced by a current of
air under pressure, especially for smelting ores. A blast
furnace is designated as hot-blast or cold-blast according to
the temperature of the air used for the blast. The furnace
is usually vertical, but varies greatly in size and shape.
Bullion - Uncoined gold and silver. Base bullion is usually pig lead
containing little gold or silver.
Claim - The portion of mining ground held under the Federal and local
laws by one claimant or association, by virtue of one loca
tion and record. Lode claims, maximum size 600 by 1,500
feet. Placer claims, 660 by 1,320 feet. A claim is some
times called a "location."
Concentrator - An apparatus in which, by the aid of water or air and
specific gravity, mechanical concentration of ores is per
formed. Also applied to the entire plant containing the
various concentrating devices, or machinery. A concentra
tion plant.
Crosscut - A small passageway driven at right angles to the main entry
to connect it with a parallel entry or air course. Also
used in Arkansas instead of "breakthrough."
Cupelling furnace - A shaft furnace with a blast, for remelting metals,
preparatory to casting. Sometimes incorrectly pronounced
and written Cupelo. Also a shaft furnace built more slightly
than the ordinary blast furnace, and usually of fire brick,
hooped or cased with iron.
Drift - A horizontal passage underground. A drift follows the vein, as
distinguished from a crosscut, which intersects it, or a
level or gallery, which may do either.
Incline - A shaft not vertical;

usually on the dip of a vein.

-8 9
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Level - A horizontal passage or dfirt into or in a mine. It is
customary to work mines by levels at regular intervals in
depth, numbered in their order below the adit or drainage
level, if there be one.
Lode - Strictly a fissure in the country-rock filled with mineral;
usually applied to metalliferous lodes. In general miners T
usage, a lode, vein, or ledge is a tabular deposit of valuable
mineral between definite boundaries. Whether it be a fissure
formation or not is not always known, and does not affect the
legal title under the United States Federal and local statutes
and customs relative lodes. But is must not be a placer, i.e.,
it must consist of quartz or other rock in place and bearing
valuable mineral.
Patent - An instrument making a conveyance or grant of public lands.
Title in fee, obtained by patent from the United States
Government, when there has been done an equivalent of $500
worth of work on or for each mining claim.
Placer - A place where gold is obtained by washing; an alluvial or
glacial deposit, as of sand or gravel, containing particles of
gold or other valuable mineral. In the United States mining
law, mineral deposits, not veins in place, are treated as
placers, so far as locating, holding, and patenting are con
cerned. Various minerals besides metallic ores have been held
to fall under this provision, but not coal, oil, or salt.
Raise - A mine shaft driven from below upward; called also upraise,
rise and riser. An opening, like a shaft, made in the back of
a level to reach a level above.
Shaft - An excavation of limited area compared with its depth, made for
finding or mining ore or coal, raising water, ore, rock, or
coal, hoisting and lowering men and material, or ventilating
undergrouns workings. The term is often specifically applied
to approximately vertical shafts, as distinguished from an
incline or inclined shaft.
Sluice box - A wooden trough in which alluvial beds are washed for the
recovery of gold or tinstone.
Stamp - A heavy pestle raised by steam or other power for crushing ore.
Those stamps in which the blow of the pestle is caused by its
mere weight are called gravity stamps,
Stope - An excavation from which the ore has been extracted, either
above or below a level, in a series of steps, A variation of
step. Usually applied to highly inclined or vertical veins.
Frequently used incorrectly as a synonym of room, which is a
wide working place in a flat mine.
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Tailings - The parts, or a part, of any incoherent or fluid material
separated as refuse, or separately treated as inferior in
quality or value; leavings; remainders; drers. In metal
lurgy, the part rejected in washing an ore that has passed
through the screens of a stamp-mill; the worthless slimes
left after the valuable portion has been separated by dres
sing or concentration. The sand, gravel and cobbles which
pass through the sluices in hydraulic mining were formerly
generally designated as tailings, but of late years, espe
cially in State and United States legislative documents,
they have been called "mining debris" or simply "debris."
Vein - An occurrence of ore, usually disseminated through a gangue,
or veinstone, and having a more or less regular development
in length, width, and depth. A vein and a lode are, in
common usage, essentially the same thing, the former being
rather the scientific, the latter the miners' name for it.
Winze - A vertical or inclined opening, or excavation, connecting
two levels in a mine, differing from a raise only in con
struction. A winze is sunk underhand and a raise is put up
overhand. When the connection is completed, and one is
standing at the top, the opening is referred to as a winze,
and when at the bottom, as a raise, or rise.
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